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Abstract
Fallback authentication (FA) techniques such as security questions, Email resets, and SMS
resets have significant security flaws that easily undermine the primary method of authentication.
Security questions have been shown to be often guessable. Email resets assume a secure channel
of communication and pose the threat of the avalanche effect; where one compromised email
account can compromise a series of other accounts. SMS resets also assume a secure channel
of communication and are vulnerable to attacks on telecommunications protocols. Additionally,
all of these FA techniques are vulnerable to the known adversary. The known adversary is any
individual with elevated knowledge of a potential victim, or elevated access to a potential victim’s
devices that uses these privileges with malicious intent, undermining the most commonly used FA
techniques.
An authentication system is only as strong as its weakest link; in many cases this is the FA
technique used. As a result of that, we explore one new and one altered FA system: GeoPassHints a
geographic authentication system paired with a secret note, as well as GeoSQ, an autobiographical
authentication scheme that relies on location data to generate questions. We also propose three
models to quantify the known adversary in order to establish an improved measurement tool
for security research. We test GeoSQ and GeoPassHints for usability, security, and deployability
through a user study with paired participants (n=34). We also evaluate the models for the purpose
of measuring vulnerabilities to the known adversary by correlating the scores obtained in each
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Fallback authentication, also known as secondary authentication, is the recovery process that
occurs when the primary means of authentication such as entering a password has failed. The three
most common fallback authentication methods are security questions which are sometimes referred
to as personal knowledge questions, Email resets, and SMS resets. The fallback authentication
method is very important because it can completely bypass a strong primary authentication, and
a weak fallback authentication system undermines the security of our accounts/devices.
The most commonly utilized fallback authentication methods are especially vulnerable to what
we call the known adversary. The known adversary is any individual with elevated first hand
knowledge of a potential victim and/or elevated access to a potential victim’s devices, that uses
these privileges with malicious intent. Elevated knowledge of a potential attack victim can make
it very easy for an attacker to correctly answer security questions as a fallback authentication
method. Elevated access to a potential victim’s devices (e.g., mobile device is left lying around)
makes Email resets and SMS resets vulnerable to the known adversary. We specify first hand
knowledge to make a clear distinction between first hand knowledge and knowledge that can be
gained about a person remotely (e.g., from their social media accounts). In this work we aim to
design, implement and test alternative fallback authentication methods that are more secure, and
1
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we attempt to formally quantify the known adversary for the purposes of improving measurements
of its success in security research.
1.1 Motivation
Commonly utilized fallback authentication techniques such as security questions, Email resets,
and SMS resets all have proven security and usability flaws [17,31,34,35]. Security questions are low
entropy making them easy to guess [17,31]. Email resets and SMS resets rely on a secure channel
of communication and are vulnerable to the known adversary [38, 40, 42, 55]. This motivated our
effort to design, implement, and test alternative fallback authentication systems.
An important threat to evaluate for fallback authentication systems is the known adversary.
The known adversary is the threat posed to the security of our accounts/devices from social
insiders. The known adversary was first identified as the “insider threat” by Muslukhov et al. [42].
We use this term to avoid confusion with the more common use of the term “insider threat”,
which is most often used to describe trusted individuals within an organization who abuse their
power [52]. Security research typically evaluates vulnerability to the known adversary threat
utilizing two different tiers (strong and weak) of self-reported social insiders based on self-reported
social closeness [13, 34, 35]. We hypothesize this is a flaw, as such a threat is not only posed
by a social insider (e.g., a spouse) but could be posed by many acquaintances (e.g., co-worker,
acquaintance, boss). Thus, we explore different alternative models to measure the known adversary
threat, accounting for the fact that the known adversary is any individual with elevated access to
a potential victim’s devices and/or elevated first-hand knowledge of the potential victim that uses
that privilege with malicious intent.
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1.2 Thesis Summary
In this work we design, implement, and test two candidate fallback authentication systems for
security, usability and deployability. GeoPassHints is a geographical authentication system, and
GeoSQ that uses autobiographical location data. We tested both systems through a user study
involving three different sessions. Session 1 had 19 pairs (38 participants). Session 2, which was
conducted 7-11 days after Session 1, had 17 pairs (34 participants) who returned. Lastly, Session 3
is scheduled to be 6 months after Session 2 and has not been completed as of this date. However,
our results from Session 2 are sufficiently conclusive that we can report on our results at this time.
We do not expect any phenomenal improvements in Session 3 due to the memorability results bad
usability results obtained for GeoPassHints in Session 2.
We also design and create three models to quantify the known adversary. In order to test
whether or not the models for quantifying the known adversary yielded any results, our study
included a guessing phase, where each participant actively guessed their pair’s GeoPassHints secret
notes and GeoSQ autobiographical locations. We attempted a correlation between the scores
obtained in the models, and the results of the GeoSQ pair guessing scores. A high correlation
meant that the model was successful. Two of the three models we designed and created were
successful. All of the models we created had a more positive correlation with the GeoSQ pair
guessing scores than simple self-reporting the relationship characterization by participants, which
security research has typically relied on [13,34,35]. Note that this was not done for GeoPassHints
as there were so few successful guesses by the known adversaries.
We concluded that two models were successful (the KAI and the adapted RCI). We also con-
cluded that while GeoPassHints and GeoSQ offered increased security in some categories when
compared to commonly utilized fallback authentication techniques, they were unusable due to
high error rates, and long login times on average.
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1.3 Thesis Statement
This thesis explores one new and one altered fallback authentication system as a possible
replacement to the current commonly utilized fallback authentication systems. This thesis also
explores models to quantify the known adversary for the purposes of a more formal classification.
The following questions will be addressed in this research:
1. How does the security, usability, and deployability of GeoPassHints compare to the commonly
utilized fallback authentication techniques?
2. How does the security, usability, and deployability of GeoSQ compare to the commonly
utilized fallback authentication techniques?
3. Do the models created for quantifying the known adversary prove to be promising in showing
a correlation between pair guesses and scores obtained from the models?
4. How does utilizing the models we have created to quantify the known adversary compare to
self-reported relationship characterization in identifying the known adversary?
1.4 Contributions
Our contributions are as follows: (1) We design, implement, and test a new geographic fallback
authentication system called GeoPassHints which is inspired by GeoPassNotes [39], location-based
security questions [35], and work on authentication hints [11]. (2) We design, implement and test
an altered autobiographical location authentication system we call GeoSQ. (3) We conduct a user
study in order to test the usability, security, and deployability of both authentication systems
and collect data for evaluating our models to quantify the known adversary. (4) We develop
three models to quantify the known adversary and evaluate the correlation between the scores
from the models and the GeoSQ pair guessing scores, demonstrating that our models offer an
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improvement over the typical self-relationship declaration utilized by a previous security research
in this area [13,34,35].
1.5 Thesis Organization
Following Chapter 1, this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a literature review
of the known adversary threat, flaws in current fallback authentication systems, geographic au-
thentication systems, autobiographical authentication systems, measuring relationship closeness,
utilizing hints for increased memorability, multiple passwords interference, and lastly a framework
for the comparative evaluation of web authentication schemes. Chapter 3 will detail the user study.
Chapter 4 will introduce the models for measuring the known adversary that we created, and it
will include the comparison as well as the statistical analysis of results. Chapter 5 will evaluate
GeoSQ for security, usability, and deployability. Chapter 6 will evaluate GeoPassHints for secu-
rity, usability, and deployability. Chapter 7 will include the discussion and future work, and lastly,




Commonly utilized fallback authentication techniques such as security questions, email resets,
and SMS resets have many flaws in their security and usability [13,17,31,34,35] that have motivated
many attempts to try to find alternatives [13,34,35]. Despite all their security flaws, security ques-
tions, email resets, and SMS resets continue to be the dominant fallback authentication techniques
used today [17,31,35], due to their usability.
A threat that undermines the security of all the common fallback authentication techniques
is the threat of the known adversary [42]. The known adversary is any potential attacker with
elevated knowledge of a potential victim or elevated access to the devices of a potential victim
as a result of any type of relationship (e.g., friend, close friend, spouse, co-worker) that uses that
privilege for malicious intent. As such, our research focuses on finding alternative authentication
techniques that have the ability to deter the known adversary while at the same time providing
increased usability and security across many different criteria.
We begin our literature review with related work that identifies how pertinent of a threat the
known adversary is (see Section 2.3).
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Next, we explore related work on scales utilized in the field of Social Psychology to measure and
quantify relationship closeness (see Section 2.5), which we attempt to do in an effort to formally
quantify the known adversary. The next portion of our literature review focuses on current flaws
the most commonly utilized fallback authentication techniques (see Section 2.6). Followed by that,
we explore related work on alternative authentication techniques that motivated our research, such
as autobiographical authentication and geographic authentication (see Section 2.4).
After exploring related work that attempts to measure relationship closeness, we move on
to exploring related work on improving the memorability of geographic, autobiographical, and
classical password-based authentication techniques (see Section 2.7). We also explore the effect
of multiple password interference, which occurs when users utilize an authentication system in
a real-world scenario for multiple accounts/devices [11, 22] (see Section 2.8). Multiple password
interference occurs when the authentication credentials associated with one account are mistakenly
input while attempting to authenticate into a different account (e.g., using your Facebook password
while trying to login to your Twitter account).
Next, we explore the Bonneau et al. [18] framework for the comparative evaluation of authen-
tication frameworks. In our work, we utilize this framework as it provides us with guidelines
and criteria that formalize the evaluation of the two systems that we designed and implemented
(GeoPassHints and GeoSQ). The Bonneau et al. framework provides us with criteria to evaluate
our authentication systems for usability, deployability, and security (see Section 2.9). Further-
more, since passwords are the baseline in which the framework for the comparative evaluation of
authentication frameworks relies on and they are mentioned often as a reference, Section 2.10 will
cover related work on passwords. Lastly we will highlight the focus of our research in relation to
previous work in Section ??.
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2.2 Research Focus
Due to the breadth of the related work presented, it is pertinent that we present the focus of
this research in relation to the related work.
We will begin this literature review with a focus on the known adversary, quantifying the known
adversary, and the flaws that exist within currently utilized fallback authentication systems. This
was done to ground our goal of researching alternative fallback authentication methods that are
more secure and usable.
We go on to explore the field of alternative authentication techniques. Section 2.6 of the
literature review was pertinent to explore what has already been done in the field of alternative
authentication techniques. We review this work to ensure that our implementation is not flawed
due to some usability or security flaw discovered by other research. Alternative authentication
techniques are oftentimes authentication systems that have been researched but not implemented
on a large scale by a giant verifier such as Google. In section 2.6 we discuss several different
alternative authentication systems relevant to GeoPassHints and GeoSQ.
Furthermore, in order to improve the memorability of GeoPassHints and GeoSQ, we explore
what related work has discovered in terms of improving the memorability of autobiographic, geo-
graphic, and classic password based authentication schemes. We used that related work in order
to attempt to improve the memorability of GeoSQ and GeoPassHints. We attempted to include
the lessons learned from related work to the best of our ability in our implementation of GeoSQ
and GeoPassHints.
Furthermore, we discuss password interference because any new authentication system that is
meant to be utilized on a larger scale needs to account for the user having multiple accounts while
verifying in the same or similar manner. The interference effect is important because it could
affect the usability (specifically the memorability) in addition to the security of the authentication
systems we are testing.
We discussed a comparative framework for evaluating authentication schemes, more specifically
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the Bonneau et al. framework for comparatively evaluating authentication schemes [18]. This was
important to our research because we needed a formal framework to compare the security, usability,
and deployability of GeoPassHints and GeoSQ to that of similar authentication schemes or at least
to fallback authentication schemes that are currently being widely utilized.
Lastly, we will discuss relevant research in text based passwords because passwords and pass-
word variants are the most utilized authentication mechanism in the world. As a result, many
security researchers compare their authentication schemes in terms of security and usability to
that of the common text based password and its variants. In addition to that, it was important for
us to know what constitutes a safe and secure password because GeoPassHints contains a secret
note component to authentication which could be considered similar to a text based password. We
utilized the related work in that field to set policies which will be explained in later chapters.
Our work builds on previously proposed alternative authentication systems and improves on
them by incorporating the important lessons learned from related work. We also utilize the work
done in the field of Social Psychology in order to better understand and accurately define the known
adversary. We created our models for quantifying the known adversary based on the related work
in the field of Social Psychology.
We proposed and tested GeoPassHints; a novel authentication system that was based on
GeoPassNotes and GeoPass [39] [48]. GeoPassHints is a significant alteration of GeoPassNotes.
GeoPassNotes is an authentication system that utilizes a location input on a map in addition to
a secret note in order to authenticate, while GeoPassHints utilizes the location set by the user
as a cue to aid in the user’s ability to remember the secret note. This is the first study of this
kind for GeoPassHints and it is the first comprehensive usability and security analysis for this
kind of system. In addition to that, GeoSQ is an autobiographic authentication scheme that was
implemented and improved upon by us but was originally implemented and proposed by related
work [13] [12] [35]. We improve on GeoSQ by ensuring that we included the lessons learned from
related work within the settings of the implementation. We utilize both alternative authentication
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 10
systems in order to test our models pertaining to the known adversary. The models are a highly
important contribution because they are one of the first attempts to classify known adversaries
without the need for self declaration. By proposing and implementing GeoPassHints, and im-
plementing and improving GeoSQ as well as running an in person lab study to test the security
and usability of both authentication systems, we further contribute to the research conducted by
related works by analyzing alternative authentication schemes and conducting a thorough security
and usability analysis.
2.3 Known Adversary
Muslukhov et al. [42], to the best of our knowledge, present the first to attempt to study the
prevalence of breaches by insiders through the use of an online survey (n=724). The survey results
identified that 12% of surveyed users were aware of a breach of their privacy by an individual the
user considered an insider, which we refer to as a known adversary (to avoid confusion with the more
common use of the term “insider” which is most often used to describe trusted individuals within
an organization who abuse their trust [52]). In addition, 9% of survey participants admitted to
accessing the device of a socially close individual without consent. Through this survey, Muslukhov
et al. demonstrated that the fear of the known adversary threat was indeed a valid one among many
users and showed that known adversaries accessing devices and accounts without authorization is
indeed a major security flaw. This security flaw indicates that we must enhance our security
research in order to account for this threat, since a known adversary can bypass many traditional
security mechanisms.
Security research evaluating new authentication systems typically relies on recruiting partici-
pant pairs in order to evaluate the threat of the known adversary [12,13,34,35]. Followed by that,
they classify the known participating pairs into strong and weak known adversaries.
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2.4 Measuring Relationship Closeness
The known adversary is an important threat model in security research discussed in Section
2.5 due to the elevated access to devices and elevated first-hand knowledge of the potential victim.
To quantify whether a pair is indeed a known adversary, we must first be able to quantify the
relationship between the adversary and the participant in security research. In the quest to quantify
relationship closeness, we discuss several different relationship closeness indices/scales used in the
social sciences.
Berscheidl et al. [16] proposed one of the most popular relationship closeness measurement tools
in the form of a questionnaire (Appendix A). The Relationship Closeness Inventory (henceforth
RCI) is used to quantify the closeness of two people to each other, but is not specifically tailored
towards security research and quantifying the known adversary in today’s world. The RCI in its
original format as proposed by Berscheidl et al. does not contain any questions regarding pairs
accessing each other’s devices, which is more pertinent now that it was in 1989.
The RCI is split into three subscales starting with RCI Frequency which measures the frequency
of activities being performed together by the pair. This is particularly important when trying to
quantify the known adversary because the more time spent together, the more autobiographical
data is less secure (i.e., if a pair spend a lot of time together autobiographical location questions
become obsolete because the known adversary could easily know all the answers). The second RCI
subscale is RCI Diversity which measures the diverse breadth of activities that pairs undertake
together. The third RCI subscale is RCI Strength, which measures the amount of influence an
individual has over his/her pair. The sum of all three subscales make up the RCI score with
quantifies how close two people are to each other.
We create an adapted RCI model, which includes portions of the RCI in addition to questions
to account for modern technology (i.e., access to devices, access to accounts etc... (see Appendix
C). In this work, we attempt to establish a correlation between the number of successful guesses
and the adapted RCI score using a linear regression analysis, in an attempt to validate the use of
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the adapted RCI for the purpose of quantifying the known adversary.
Another popular tool from the field of Social Psychology is the Inclusion of the Other in the Self
Scale (henceforth IoS Scale) developed by Aron and Smollan [14]. The IoS Scale is a simple pictorial
tool that allows the participant to pick the image that most closely resembles the relationship to
the pair (see Appendix B). The IoS Scale is a very simple pictorial tool that does not take that
long to complete by the participant. It was created with the goal of replacing the RCI, as the
amount of time it takes for a participant to complete the RCI questionnaire is often a limiting
factor due to time constraints.
Cialdini et al. [24] contributed the We Scale. The We Scale presents a Likert Scale question
with seven levels. The question asked is: “Please, select the appropriate number below to indicate
to what extent you would use the term “WE” to characterize you and this individual”. The lowest
on the seven-point scale is 1 = “not at all” and the highest is 7 = “very much so”. This is another
compact way to measure closeness. The twist is that Cialdini suggests what is referred to as a
oneness score. The average between the IoS Scale and the We Scale is called the oneness score.
In this work we attempt to establish a correlation between the number of successful guesses and
the oneness score by means of a linear regression analysis for the purpose of validating the use of
Social Psychology frameworks within security research to quantify the known adversary.
Gachter et al. [28] performed a study (n= 772) on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk with the aim of
establishing a correlation between the IoS Scale, and several other relationship closeness scales/in-
ventories. The result was positive and a high correlation was found when a principal component
analysis was conducted to construct an Index of Relationship Closeness in order to correlate it
with the results obtained from the IoS scale. The Index of Relationship Closeness is essentially a
table that shows the correlation of many different relationship closeness metrics to the IoS Scale,
based on the data from 772 participants. We are most concerned with the high correlation be-
tween the IoS Scale and the RCI because the IoS Scale is more compact and does not ask as many
questions (making it more efficient in a sure study). In this work, we compare the correlation of
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the successful guesses and the oneness score obtained with the correlation of the successful guesses
and the adapted RCI score (see Appendix B and C). We perform this comparison analysis in order
to establish whether a compact tool for quantifying relationship closeness is sufficient instead of
using the adapted RCI score which is more time consuming for participants in security research.
2.5 Flaws and Attacks in/on Current Popular Fallback
Authentication Techniques
The three most popular fallback authentication mechanisms are security questions, Email re-
sets, and SMS resets. In this section we will list a number of flaws and attacks on these fallback
authentication techniques. The weaknesses presented are the motivation for our attempt to design,
implement, and test new authentication systems.
2.5.1 Security Questions
The safety of fallback authentication mechanisms was put into question by several different
researchers in the field. According to Just et al. [37], security questions often have a very low en-
tropy, even when users are prompted to purposefully input security questions and security answers
that would be tough to guess. The study found that despite the prompt, the answers were still
considered to be very guessable.
Another study completed by Golla et al. [31] evaluated the security of challenge questions.
After completing an analysis on 3.9 million answers to security questions that were leaked from
an online dating website, Golla et al. found that the answers were extremely low entropy making
them very easy to guess. Furthermore, users would input fake answers in an attempt to make it less
guessable. After analyzing that data, Golla et al. found that inputting fake answers actually had
a negative impact on the true entropy hence further decreasing the security of security questions.
Bonneau et al. [17] also performed an analysis on the security and usability of security questions.
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The findings were in line with Golla et al. [31]. Bonneau et al. found that in 37% of instances, users
would attempt to make the answers harder to guess by adding a word to the end or the beginning
of an answer. Often times this led to the exact opposite effect, mainly due to the predictability
in the methods which users were deploying to make their answers seemingly unpredictable. The
study goes on to establish the perceived memorability versus the actual memorability. Through
the analysis of millions of password recovery attempts, it was found that 40% of users failed to
remember their security questions’ answers when needed. This is contradictory to the inspiration
behind using security questions, which is their perceived usability and memorability. Bonneau et
al. went on to compare SMS resets to security questions and found that an SMS reset code had
an 80% chance of success which is significantly higher than the chance of success with security
questions (which was 60%).
2.5.2 Email Resets
Email resets have also been proven to be effective in terms of usability for fallback authentica-
tion. Garfinkel [29] presented one of the earliest works investigating utilizing email resets instead
of personal knowledge questions. However, several security considerations were also discussed.
The main security consideration when utilizing email for account password resets was making the
email a single point of attack as well as a single point of failure. Should the recovery email account
be compromised, many other accounts become compromised and linkable. Accounts are linkable
when one account being compromised leads to other accounts being compromised, even if they
are registered with different verifiers. This can be as a result of the same credentials being used
across multiple different accounts, or because the security of one account is based on the security
of another. Garfinkel also noted an important usability concern that occurs when the user forgets
the password to the email or has lost access to the email that is designated as the reset email.
Guri et al. [32] describe a man in the middle attack that proves the secure channel that email
resets rely on can be compromised. The man in the middle attack involves a malicious application
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on a smartphone that requests access to resources and applications that it is not supposed to have,
and does not need to have. This includes compromising popular emailing applications which could
compromise email resets to a great extent. This attack using a malicious application can also be
used to compromise SMS resets as well and will be described in greater detail in Section 2.4.3.
Malicious applications with the ability to snoop on our communications channels undermine the
security provided by email resets and SMS resets.
Email resets are also vulnerable to the known adversary. The primary reason being the fact
that email resets are easy to view by a known adversary. By definition, a known adversary is
any individual with elevated access to a potential victim’s devices and/or elevated first hand
knowledge of the potential victim. Email resets can often be seen on the notifications of a locked
screen, depending on the settings set by the user on a smartphone.
Furthermore email resets are also vulnerable to the known adversary because man in the middle
attacks as described by Guri et al. [32] are easier to execute with increased physical access to a
potential victim’s devices. The known adversary is also connected to the same networks that the
potential victim is connected to. With this advantage many other kinds of snooping attacks on
email resets are possible.
2.5.3 SMS Resets
As for SMS resets, they are highly vulnerable to many different types of attacks. Al-Maqlabi
and Mitchell [40] noted that most SMS reset codes are only six digits long, which means there are
only 106 possibilities which makes it possible for an attacker to run a guessing algorithm. As such,
Al-Maqlabi and Mitchell note that it is imperative for websites to limit the number of attempts a
user is allowed. They also note that SMS resets rely on one factor, which is that the channel in
which the SMS is being sent is actually secure. However, the authors refer to successful attacks
that compromise the contents of an SMS via the usage of an IMSI catcher or “Stingray” [38]. An
IMSI catcher will mimic a cell tower and send signals to the mobile phone to trick it into connecting
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to it, and trick it into sending information that should only be shared with the cell tower. IMSI
catchers do have certain limitations because they have to be in the same area as the target mobile
phone.
The use of attacks on telecommunications protocols such as the SS7 protocol [55], which allows
telecommunications companies to share information for accurate billing, also compromises the
supposedly secure channel that is being relied upon to deliver SMS reset codes for account recovery.
The SS7 protocol which allows telecommunications companies to share information for accurate
billing, is an old protocol that has not been updated in quite some time; as a result there are some
communications protocols that run on SS7 that have no authentication protocol [7] (i.e., a phone
with no PIN to secure it). Attackers exploiting the SS7 protocol vulnerabilities can triangulate
a cellphones location, view sensitive billing data, and monitor communications (calls and SMS).
This attack does not share the limitations posed by IMSI catchers because they can be conducted
remotely, without the need to be in the immediate area of the potential victim.
It is important to note that the flaw in the SS7 protocol is promptly being mitigated by major
telecommunications companies. However, Welch et al. [55], did manage to successfully demonstrate
the exploits available to an attacker as a result of the flaws in the SS7 protocol. In addition to that,
many online sources provide detailed instructions on how to take advantage of the exploit [7]. The
tools required are pretty simple and easy to obtain. Most types of Linux OS can be utilized to take
advatnage of the exploits, in tandem with a free and readily available SS7 software development
kit (SDK) [7]. We reiterate that telecommunications networks have already patched some of the
exploits at the time of this writing.
Gelerenter et al [30] describe a man in the middle attack on fallback authentication systems
that rely on two techniques (i.e., security questions + SMS resets, or security questions + Email
resets). The attack is a mixture of a man in the middle attack and phishing. The attack is focused
on a malicious website that has the primary purpose of collecting answers to security questions.
The second phase of the attack is telling the user to expect an SMS reset code. At that point in
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time, the attacker is actually on the legitimate website beginning the steps required to send out
an SMS reset code (with the power of the answers to the security questions) from the legitimate
website which the user actually has an account on. The target then receives that SMS reset code
and since the SMS reset code is not labelled (i.e., your reset code is xyz but the message does
not say which account this reset code is for), the targeted user will then enter the SMS reset code
into the malicious website, providing the attacker with all the information necessary to access the
account. Following the same steps this attack was also described as a means to attack Email resets.
The authors go on to describe some of the counter measures that verifiers can use to avoid such
an attack from being successful, such as inputting the website name the reset code was designated
for (e.g., this is your reset code for your Twitter account, so that the user does not input the reset
code into the malicious website), and making the code valid for a limited period of time.
Guri et al [32] perform a thorough analysis on password recovery techniques (fallback authen-
tication techniques) for popular internet service providers such as Facebook, Gmail, and Twitter.
In their review of the password recovery techniques, they found leakage of private information such
as partial Emails and phone numbers that may be useful to attackers. Within their examination of
password recovery techniques for popular internet service providers they describe possible attacks
on SMS resets and email resets. The attack scenario described in this work is based on a malicious
Android application that requests access to resources such as SMS texts and emails. This jeop-
ardizes SMS resets and email resets since many applications can request access to resources they
do not need. It is important to note that more recent versions of Android (Android Nougat, and
Android Oreo) and iOS have significantly limited the ability to request access to resources and
have required explicit consent for each resource being accessed, rather than a one-time acceptance
of all resources accessed at the time of installation. Nevertheless, for many devices that still run
older versions of Android or iOS, it is highly possible that an application can indeed ask for consent
to utilize resources that are not necessarily pertinent to the stated function of the application, and
therefore be able to snoop on email reset codes and SMS reset codes.
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 18
Much like email resets, SMS resets are also vulnerable to the known adversary for the same
reasons. SMS reset codes can oftentimes be viewed form a lock screen, depending on the privacy
settings. A known adversary that has elevated access to a potential victim’s devices can reasonably
initiate a reset and obtain the code from the potential victim’s phone (since the known adversary
enjoys elevated access).
The preceding work gave us ample evidence that a security risk is posed by security questions,
Email resets, and SMS resets which are currently the most commonly utilized fallback authen-
tication techniques [30, 31, 37, 40]. Also, there is a lack of usability when it comes to security
questions [17]. As a result, a great deal of research is being done into alternatives to current
fallback authentication techniques. One such alternative is the usage of autobiographical authen-
tication; another alternative is the use of geographic authentication.
2.5.4 User Attitudes and Perceptions
Before we delve into the different alternative fallback authentication techniques, it is important
to note user attitudes towards current fallback authentication techniques.
Hang et al. [35] performed a user-based survey (n=244) to gauge public opinion on the fallback
authentication process that occurs as a result of device lockout, account lockout, and SIM lockout.
Device lockout occurs when a user enters a PIN, pattern, or password incorrectly a number of
times. Typically, what occurs is a throttling mechanism called exponential back-off where the user
has to wait a predetermined time after entering an incorrect credential. After the lockout period,
if the credential is entered incorrectly again, then the wait time before the user can re-enter the
credentials is increased. In some cases, the exponential back-off is not reversible and will have to
be taken to the manufacturer for a reset.
Account lockout also occurs when credentials are entered incorrectly; however, the typical
fallback authentication mechanism is a security question or an Email reset. The work by Hang
et al. [35] delved into SMS resets which are also commonly used for fallback authentication. The
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third type of lockout discussed is the SIM card lockout, this is an uncommon type of lockout that
occurs only if the user has a PIN set for the SIM card. In the case of a SIM card lockout, the user
typically must enter some sort of PUK (PIN Unlock Key).
The work done by Hang et al. [35] is important because it showcases user attitudes towards the
usability of current fallback authentication methods. The study concluded that the majority of
participants surveyed appear satisfied with current fallback authentication mechanisms. However,
the edge cases such as being in a place with no cell reception when initiating a SIM reset are
problematic. Participants appeared to be most content with fallback authentication for account
lockouts as those tended to be the easiest to recover. Followed by that they ranked recovery from
a device lockout as the second easiest with some persistent cases which were particularly annoying
(e.g., cases were the user had to go to the manufacturer to unlock the device). Lastly, SIM lockout
recovery was the most difficult but not many users in the study had experienced it before. Despite
the lack of security current systems offer, the usability of the systems will ultimately decide whether
or not a system is utilized. The usability of the systems still has to be matched by relative security.
However, as it stands today, the most usable systems are not often them most secure.
2.6 Alternative Authentication Techniques
In the same work where Hang et al. [35] gauged user attitudes towards current fallback authen-
tication techniques, Hang et al. propose an alternate authentication technique which relies on an
app based utilization queries. In the case of a device lockout for example, an app would activate
that would ask the user regarding apps that are current installed on the smartphone. If the user
answered 80% of the questions correctly then the user would be granted access.
Hang et al. [35] incorporated the known adversary into the work by asking recruited participants
to bring a strong adversary (someone the participant is close to). The pairs self-declared their
relationship to the owner of the phone, and the participants were asked to bring someone along
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that they would consider close. The participants were asked to bring someone close to them to
mimic a strong adversary and were given examples of who a close adversary would be such as a
partner or a close friend [35]. This is part of the problem that we attempt to solve by attempting
to quantify the relationship between the participant and the adversary that is typically present
within security research. The known/strong adversary in this scenario is only being imagined as
an individual that is socially close to the participant, and this is being self-reported rather than
quantified.
The results of this study were very promising in terms of repelling the threat of the known
adversary, because while the threshold for allowing access was 80%, no adversary achieved over
61% correctness. Legitimate users had a 95% success rate with 15 recruited participants, and each
recruited participant brought along an adversary. App installation history is a form of autobio-
graphical authentication. The questions take the form of multiple choice questions asking which
applications were recently installed, and which applications were recently uninstalled.
Another study that explored alternative authentication techniques, specifically autobiographi-
cal authentication was the study completed by Albayram et al. [13]. Albayram et al. focus on the
usability, and security of using different types of autobiographical data for authentication. Many
different types of autobiographical data are collected and used for the purpose of fallback authenti-
cation. Autobiographical data can include anything from mobile device usage data, communication
data, or location data.
Call (incoming and outgoing), SMS (incoming and outgoing), location, application, music,
activity, and battery data were collected for the purposes of evaluating their uses from a usability
and security standpoint. The security standpoint was evaluated through the usage of an adversary
model, one that is näıve and the other is a strong adversary. The study included 24 participants
recruited in pairs (12 pairs) and the study spanned 30 days.
In the 30-day field study, the user’s data was collected using a monitoring application on
their mobile devices. Followed by that they were queried about their autobiographical data.
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Nine autobiographical questions were asked of each participant (one from each category; call and
SMS are considered two categories incoming and outgoing), and the participants were only asked
questions about data collected in the last 24 hours. AlBayram et al. noted that the reasoning
behind utilizing data collected in the last 24 hours only was the fact that autobiographical data is
episodic memory which tends to be more memorable in shorter time spans [25].
The study determined an accuracy score for each type of user in relation to the type of auto-




Call 0.76 0.13 0.008
SMS 0.46 0.08 0.002
Location 0.69 0.29 0.038
App 0.55 -0.03 -0.549
Music 0.46 -0.71 -1.782
Activity 0.42 0.06 -0.240
Battery 0.53 -0.005 -0.157
Table 2.1: Accuracy in responses for each type of user and each type of autobiographical data
collected and queried. Negative scores are as a result of penalty system imposed on incorrect
answers. Please note that this is remake of the original table. [13]
The results as shown in Table 2.1 above summarize the security-usability tradeoff. Given a
known adversary threat model, the use of autobiographical data for fallback authentication proved
highly effective in repelling an attacker. At the same time, the accuracy rates by legitimate users
proves that it is not highly usable without a low threshold for authentication. The two types of
autobiographical data that yielded the highest accuracy from legitimate users are call and location
data. Both those types also yielded the highest accuracy among strong adversaries. This could
indicate a relation between the implementation method (e.g., only utilizing location data from the
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past 24 hours which could be easier to guess) and the method that the accuracy score is calculated,
as opposed to true usability and a security flaw.
Negative accuracy score by naive/strong adversaries are as a result of the penalty system put
in place in the accuracy score calculation for incorrect answers, in this penalty system it is not
simply the number of correct answers out of nine that is taken into consideration. Instead a series
of incorrect answers could lead to negative scores because the user is being punished by the system
for inputting incorrect answers and not utilizing a simple threshold (e.g., 5 out of 9 correct answers
is a successful login).
It is important to note that the adversaries were self-declared and that this the motivation
for improving this practice in security research. We would like an empirical study to determine
closeness and that is the reason why the models for discovering the known adversary were created.
Hang et al. [34] also conducted a similar study on autobiographical data being used for the
purpose of fallback authentication. In this study, seven categories of autobiographical data were
examined. SMS out, SMS in, call out, call in, application (usage and installation details), music,
and photos. This is slightly different than the autobiographical data collected in Albayram et al’s.
field studies. The results yielded were significantly different. In Hang’s work, communication data
such as SMS in, SMS out, calls in, and calls out, as well as Application installation / uninstallation
autobiographical data proved to be the most promising. This is in contrast to Albayram et al’s
results [13], which concluded that, SMS related queries did not yield enough accuracy among
legitimate users. The call-related autobiographical data was comparable between the two studies.
Another alternative method for fallback authentication that is being investigated is geographic
authentication. Geographic authentications schemes are authentication schemes that utilize a map
so that the user can set a location.
MacRae et al . [39] [48] investigated geographic authentication schemes as an alternative to
traditional authentication. In MacRae et al. two geographic authentication schemes were designed
and investigated for usability and security. The first geographic authentication scheme they de-
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signed was GeoPass. GeoPass is a simple geographic authentication scheme were the user is shown
a map of the world, the user is asked to zoom to a predefined minimum level (zoom level 16) and
is asked to set the location. The location set is then used to authenticate the user later on with a
21 by 21 pixel box error tolerance, therefore if the user makes a small input mistake that will not
affect the usability since that answer would be accepted. The second geographic authentication
scheme MacRae et al. designed was GeoPassNotes. In this geographic authentication scheme the
user is not only asked to set a location but is also asked to associate a note with the location (an
annotation to the location without actually labelling the location).
GeoPass and GeoPassNotes were tested using different participants (n=35 and n=30 respec-
tively). The study was run across three sessions. In the first session the participants were asked
to set and confirm their login credentials, and after a distraction questionnaire was administered
(10 – 20 minutes) they were asked to login again. This session was in person. Session 2 was
held online within 2 days. All participants in the GeoPassNotes study returned however only 33
returned for the GeoPass study. Both systems had a 100% memorability rate with very few failed
login attempts (they were given up to five attempts).
Session 3 was held in the lab and was held 7 days after Session 2. All GeoPassNotes study
participants returned, however only 30 GeoPass study participants returned. Again, nearly perfect
memorability across both systems (97% for GeoPass, and 100% for GeoPassNotes) was observed
with very few failed login attempts.
The security of GeoPass given the error margin was low when not paired with stringent require-
ments on the number of guesses therefore making GeoPass more suitable for online authentication
with stringent restrictions. GeoPassNotes offered significantly greater resistance to online and of-
fline attacks however, one concern was that the users were setting locations/annotations that were
significant life events and thus could potentially be easily guessed by a known adversary.
Hang et al. [34] also developed a geographic authentication technique that was meant to be an
alternative to security questions. In this geographical authentication technique users were guided
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by predefined questions (i.e., Whereto was your first travel by plane?), guided questions (i.e.,
Please define a location-based question that refers to a travel destination/vacation destination),
or open ended questions (i.e., users input the question in a textbox) [34]. After that, the users
were asked to select a location on the map. The proposed method of fallback authentication was
tested for security as well as usability. The method of testing was through the use of a user study
that spanned six months. The study included 32 participants, 28 of the 32 acted as both the close
adversary and the main participant, two participants only acted as primary users, and lastly two
participants only acted as close adversaries. The participants were asked to bring a pair that was
considered close (e.g., partner or close friend). Interestingly, the pairs were asked to state the
relationships between each other and in four cases the answers did not match. Thus, underlining
the subjectivity of this method for defining the known adversary. The users were first asked to
enroll the locations that they would like to use for fallback authentication (Session 1). They were
asked to enroll the locations for 3 predefined questions, 3 guided questions, and 3 open ended
questions that they set. They were asked to come back four weeks later to evaluate memorability.
The results showed that 90% of users were able to successfully remember all the location set after
four weeks (Session 2).
Furthermore, to get more thorough results the authors of the paper asked the participants
in the study to return after a period of six months had elapsed (Session 3), the results were
also promising, and 92% of the participants were able to remember the locations that they had
previously enrolled with an error rate of thirty meters around the location that they initially
enrolled six months earlier. Our study design to assess usability (specifically the memorability
criteria within usability) was motivated by Hang et al’s work [34].
Futhermore, the authors of the paper also did a security analysis based on known adversaries
attempting to guess the locations that were enrolled by different users. This was done to test if
users simply selected locations that were easily guessable by an attacker with knowledge about
the user. The results were very promising, and adversaries had limited success in guessing the
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answers despite the fact that they could use the internet to search information about the victim.
Close adversaries that were not allowed to perform an internet search guessed 7.5% (6/80) location
questions correctly, close adversaries that were allowed to perform an internet search guessed 10%
(8/80), adversaries that did not know study participants were only able to guess 3.75%(3/80)
location questions correctly.
In addition to that, another graphical authentication system is PassPoints [56]. PassPoints is a
graphical authentication system developed to replace classical text password based authentication
schemes.In PassPoints users place points on a single image and utilize those points for authen-
tication in the future. PassPoints was originally only evaluated for usability and it was found
that users typically took longer to authenticate using PassPoints and typically had more failed
attempts but users did successfully create valid graphical passwords within a short period of time.
The study conducted by Wiedenbeck et al. [56] did not include an in depth security analysis and
was more focused on the usability aspect.
Thorpe et al. [50] conducted a more in depth security analysis of PassPoints specifically or any
graphical password interface that utilizes a single background image generally in order to evaluate
their security. Thorpe et al. [50] utilized a human seeded attack which takes in click points from
a subset of users and utilizes these clicks on a certain image to determine if hot spots within a
background image exist. Hot spots within an image that is being used for graphical authentication
are spots in that image that are highly likely to be selected by the user. Thorpe et al. [50] use
human seeded attacks in order to prove that in an offline environment graphical passwords are
just as vulnerable as text based passwords to targeted guessing attacks. Human seeded attacks
yielded a 36% success rate within 231 guesses. In addition to that Thorpe et al. [50] included a
security analysis that utilizes purely automated attacks using image processing techniques in order
to evaluate the resilience to offline guessing attacks of graphical passwords. The results of this
purely automated attack were not as successful as the human seeded attack with 30% of graphical
passwords guessed within 235 guesses. This work suggests that graphical passwords are indeed as
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susceptible to classical text based passwords to offline guessing attacks.
Expanding on the work done on purely automated attacks on graphical passwords Thorpe
et al. [20] [43] improve the efficiency and effectiveness of purely automated attacks on graphical
passwords to a great extent. In their first subsequent work on purely automated attacks Thorpe
et al. [43] utilize click order heuristics and a computational model of visual attention to improve
the effectiveness of purely automated attacks on graphical passwords. For two representative
images, their method of a purely automated attack on graphical passwords guessed 8-15% of
passwords using dictionaries of less than 224.6 entries for two representative images being utilized
for a graphical authentication scheme (PassPoints style) [43]. Furthermore Thorpe et al. [20]
conducted further work on improving automated attacks on click based graphical passwords this
time utilizing a graph based algorithm that creates dictionaries based on certain heuristics like click
order patterns in order to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of purely automated attacks on
graphical click based passwords. As a result the improved purely automated attack on graphical
click based passwords yielded 7-16% of passwords using dictionaries of up to 226 in size [20].
Furthermore Al-Badawi et al. [47] conducted further research on graphical passwords and
demonstrated how simple changes to a graphical password interface can change the distribution
of user chosen passwords and by extension the implied security it provides. Al-Badawi et al. [47]
simply changed the way a background image is represented to the user during the creation phase
and observed a change in the user distribution of graphical click based passwords through this
simple change in the way the background image is represented.
Thorpe et al. [49] also proposed Video Passwords. Video Passwords utilize some feature within
video playback to authenticate. More specifically Thorpe et al. [49] proposed four Video Password
schemes. The first video password scheme proposed utilizes time stamp information and is called
Timeline Video Passwords the user presses a button at various times throughout the video in
order to set the password and authentication later. The strength of Timeline Video Passwords
is comparable to that of a four number/letter PIN. The second video password scheme proposed
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is Click Based Video Passwords which asks the user to click on the video much like a graphical
password utilizing one image, with the added benefit of a video having many frames and adding
the time line information. The third scheme proposed is Tagged Video Passwords. In this scheme
the user not only selects a time within a video (similar to the first scheme proposed) but also
adds a text tag to it. Both of those the time and the text is used for authentication in the future.
Lastly, they proposed a fourth scheme titled Tagged Click Video Passwords, in this scheme the
user also clicks on the video at a certain time (of his or her choosing) and then adds text as well,
this is similar to the second proposed scheme with the added benefit and security of having a text
based input as well. An error tolerance is allowed for each scheme, however, it was found that
usability wise it is pertinent to have a slow paced video because that decreases the errors when
authenticating.
Video Passwords have the potential to replace text based passwords not only on the usability
and security fronts, but they also add a utility to the verifiers in that they offer a potential to
include sponsored paid content as the video.
2.7 Improving the Memorability of Autobiographic, Geo-
graphic, and Classic Password-Based Authentication
Schemes
Many attempts at improving the memorability of authentication schemes in general have been
made. Longer passwords have been proven to be less memorable [46], which means users will typ-
ically create more memorable (shorter and more guessable) passwords in order to aid in usability
(successful and quick logins). This creates a large divide between usability and security. Many
attempts at system assigned passwords, which fit the criteria of being hard to guess even with
advanced guessing algorithms that can perform millions of guesses a second, have failed the mem-
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orability test [46]. Most system assigned passwords often assigned by a password generator have
many special symbols and tend to be longer (depending on the policy implemented). However, this
means they only tend to be usable when used in tandem with a password manager due to the lack
of memorability of such passwords and due to how tough it is to input them without any error.
Many attempts were made to make system assigned passwords more memorable most notably by
Shay et al [46].
Shay et al. attempt to generate more usable system assigned passwords by utilizing Passphrases
that tend to be longer than the average password hence making them more immune to online and
offline guessing attacks. Passphrases are whitespace delimited sequences of natural words. Shay et
al. investigate the effect of utilizing Passphrases that are made of 3 or 4 word random combinations.
The results were disappointing in terms of memorability, but Passphrases offered more security
when compared to user assigned passwords. However, they did not perform well when compared
to system assigned passwords with the same caliber of entropy in terms of memorability.
Participants in the study found them annoying and many participants wrote down the Passphrase.
Therefore, the challenge remains; how do we encourage the creation of authentication credentials
that are not easily guessable by way of offline or online attacks and are usable at the same time?
This is where the use of hints and cues to improve memorability is useful. In previous work,
GeoPassNotes [39] [48] (see Section 2.4) offered great results in terms of memorability (100% recall
rate after one week with very few failed login attempts). GeoPassNotes requires the user to set a
location as well as an annotation and both have to be input for authentication.
Albayram and Khan [12] evaluated the use of hints in order to improve the memorability of
autobiographical authentication. The authors conducted a study that investigated the use of hints
with three types of autobiographical data (SMS logs, call logs, and location logs). The hints can be
in multiple formats with the most common one used in the study is “you called this person before
at (insert time and date)”. The study involved 24 participants (12 pairs) over a period of thirty
days with strong and näıve adversaries to investigate the security implications of providing hints
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for autobiographical questions. The findings were notable; the hints improved the memorability of
all three types of autobiographical data tested for legitimate users. The hints also had a negative
impact on the strong adversaries (close adversaries such as a spouse or best friend) and had no
impact on the ability of näıve adversaries in guessing the answers to the questions.
Lastly, Passhint is a graphical authentication system designed by Chowdhury et al. [23].
Passhint used a text-based hint in order to help a user remember a graphical password. In this
authentication system a user had to remember which image was selected by picking 1 image out of
16 a series of times. The authors found that this increased memorability of graphical authentica-
tion systems. Our motivation for attempting to utilize a geographic hint in GeoPassHints comes
from the positive results obtained all the work reviewed in this section.
2.8 Multiple Password Interference
Multiple password interference is an effect observed when an authentication system is utilized
across multiple different devices/accounts. In real world implementations an authentication system
that has been adopted is rarely utilized by only one verifier. Therefore, users tend to have multiple
accounts that utilize the same authentication system, a great example of this is passwords; many
verifiers utilize passwords for authentication.
Multiple password interference is the byproduct of having multiple verifiers utilize the same
authentication system, where the users will mistakenly input the authentication credentials asso-
ciated with a certain verifier into a different account/device for authentication (i.e., inputting your
Facebook password while trying to login to your Twitter account). Multiple password interfer-
ence does not only pertain to password like authentication schemes but can be observed in any
authentication system.
Al-Ameen and Wright [11] performed two multiple password interference studies on GeoPass
[39] [48], the first study using the original GeoPass found that users successfully remembered their
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locations set less in than 70% of all login attempts. This is an astounding finding because the
original GeoPass study when not testing for multiple password interference obtained a memora-
bility of 97%. Al-Ameen and Wright divided their user study in three sessions. During the first
Session participants (n=18). would select locations for four different accounts. One week later the
participants would be asked to come back and attempt to recall the locations they set for each
account (referred to aslogin 2). After another week has passed the participants would be asked to
come back again and attempt to login again (referred to as login 2).
In order to measure multiple password interference Al-Ameen and Wright measured the distance
between the location set for a specific account and the location input. This distance was compared
to the location’s set for the three other accounts. If the location was closer to the location set
for a different account, then that failed login attempt was considered a failure due to the effect
of multiple passwords interference. As mentioned earlier around 70% of participants managed to
login eventually (participants had five attempts per account). However out of 282 login attempts
during login 1 44.8% of attempts failed due to interference effects. During login 2 out of 309 login
attempts 38.2% failed due to interference effects [11]. Non-interference related failures were 40.4%
and 46.3% for login 1 and login 2 respectively.
The second multiple password interference study conducted by Al-Ameen and Wright was
with a modified GeoPass in an effort to mitigate the effect of multiple password interference.
Participants in this second study were prompted to associate a mental story that would be utilized
as a cue to remember the location [15, 26]. This study was designed the exact same way that
the first study was designed except for the fact that participants (n=38) were not asked to come
back to the lab for login 1 and login 2, instead it was done online. The methodology for counting
a failure to login as an interference or simply a failure due to lack of memorability also did not
change.
The results offered great improvement in mitigating the failures due to the multiple password
interference effect. In login 1, out of 237 login attempts, only 4.2% failed due to multiple password
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interference. During login 2, out of 268 login attempts, only 2.6% failed due to multiple password
interference. The login attempts required for a successful login were significantly reduced as well
because the failures as a result of multiple password interference were significantly decreased.
Non-interference related failures were 32.9% and 41.1 for login 1 and login 2 respectively.
The work done by Al-Ameen and Wright in passwords interference for GeoPass, alongside the
work Chowdhury et al. [23] did on hints, motivated our study and system design. We also have
four accounts that the participants in our study must set credentials for and attempt to remember.
In Al-Ameen and Wright’s modified GeoPass, the location set was the credential and the cue set
the mental story related to that location. In GeoPassHints, the secret note set is the credential
used for authentication which should be related to the location cue.
2.9 Comparative Framework for Evaluating Authentica-
tion Schemes
Bonneau et al. [18] proposed a widely adopted framework for comparatively evaluating authen-
tication schemes. The framework is an effective tool for comparatively evaluating the usability,
deployability, and security of any authentication scheme. It is important to note that the primary
aim of this framework was to evaluate web-based authentication schemes. However, the categories
can apply to authentication schemes in different environments.
The framework is divided into three broad categories: usability, deployability, and security.
Each of these broad categories have sub categories with certain conditions that have to be met in
order for an authentication system to be awarded under that specific subcategory. It is important
to note that the Bonneau et al. framework uses web passwords as the baseline for comparison.
The framework utilizes a black circle denoting the authentication system offering the benefit, a
hollow circle indicating the authentication system almost offers the benefit, and no circle (just a
blank space) indicating the authentication system does not offer the benefit. A shade indicates
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that this authentication system is better than passwords in a specific category, and a red shade
indicates that this authentication system is worse than passwords in a specific subcategory.
The broad category Usability has 8 different subcategories that measure different usability
features that should be common to all authentication systems. Important metrics to measure are
the error rates, login time, and credential set time. A detailed overview and explanation of each
subcategory is provided in Appendix F.
The broad category Deployability has 5 different subcategories that measure different aspects
of an authentication system that would make it deployable on a larger scale. This includes issues
such as browser compatibility and more importantly accessibility. A detailed overview of each
subcategory within Deployability is provided in Appendix F.
The broad category Security has 11 different subcategories that measure an authentication
system’s security features. We added two more categories that we believed are pertinent to our
systems. A detailed overview of each subcategory within Security is provided in Appendix F.
This framework for the comparative evaluation of authentication schemes will be utilized in
order to evaluate GeoPassHints and GeoSQ.
2.10 Passwords
A large portion of this work compares fallback authentication scheme security to password
security as a benchmark. This occurs as a result of passwords being the most commonly utilized
means of primary authentication in addition to the Bonneau et al. framework for the compara-
tive evaluation of web authentication schemes utilizing passwords as the primary benchmark and
comparing all other authentication schemes to it.
While this may seem irrelevant because passwords are primary authentication while GeoPassH-
ints and GeoSQ are targeted towards fallback authentication, it is still highly important to have a
benchmark to measure against.
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Bonneau and Preibusch [19] performed a complete analysis on password security in a web based
environment and came up with a set of weaknesses and strengths outlined in the Bonneau et al.
framework [18] for the comparative evaluation of web authentication schemes (see table 7.1).
According to their work, passwords show great promise in the usability and deployability cat-
egories. However, they seldom offer security benefits in terms of being resilient to throttled and
unthrottled guessing, and they do not offer protection against internal observation.
In addition to that it was should that passwords are not resilient to physical observation and
are highly susceptible to leaks by other verifiers.
Hanamsagar et al. [33] also explore passwords and found that users tend to reuse passwords to
a high degree, making passwords highly susceptible to leaks by other verifiers and confirming the
work completed by Bonneau and Preibusch [19].
In addition to that the Melicher et al. [41], conducted a study on the usability of and security
of text based passwords on a mobile device environment. The findings support the deployment of
GeoPassHints on a desktop/laptop environment because it was found that text based passwords
are more prone to error on a mobile environment. This effect would be exacerbated if we were
using GeoPassHints on a mobile platform due to the fact that Melicher et al. [41] found that
creating text based passwords on a mobile environment is more frustrating and takes significantly
longer. The secret note that is part of GeoPassHints is exactly the same as the input of a text
based password.
Furthermore, Melicher et al. [41] found that password policies seemed to have a different effect
on users attempting to set passwords in a mobile environment versus users attempting to set
passwords on a desktop/laptop environment. Specifically, users attempted to make the password
easier to enter on a mobile environment. As a result, the password policies yielded statistically
weaker set passwords on a mobile environment. This further motivates utilizing a autobiographical
authentication scheme such as GeoSQ on a mobile environment because it does not require a great
deal of detailed input on a mobile device.
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In addition to that, Ji et al. [36] noted that cultural considerations or differences in regions
can be utilized in order to make training password crackers more efficient hence needing fewer
guessing attempts. Ji et al. [36] also note that password leakages tend to make certain password
more susceptible to various cracking methods and that password meters need to take that into
consideration. Furthermore, building on the work of Castelluccia et al. [21], Ji et al. note that
leveraging social media mining or personal information extracted from social media in general is
highly effective in reducing the number of guesses that a password cracker requires to successfully
crack a subset of passwords. According to Castellucia et al. [21] utilizing personal information
that is publicly available and applying that personal information to leaked data sets speeds up
password guessing by approximately 30%. Lastly, both Ji et al [36] and Castellucia et al. [21] note
that password meters being utilized by verifiers need to utilize this information so that the they
can better advise their users on password selection.
Chapter 3
Models for Quantifying the Known
Adversary
3.1 Introduction
The known adversary is any potential attacker with elevated first-hand knowledge of a potential
victim and/or elevated access to the potential victim’s devices. The elevated knowledge or elevated
access usually comes as a virtue of having some sort of relationship with the potential victim of
an attack (i.e., spouse, co-worker, close friend). The known adversary was first identified by
Muslukhov et al. [42] and identified as the insider threat. We coined the term known adversary
because the risk of elevated access to a potential victim’s devices or elevated knowledge of the
potential victim does not only come from social insiders such as close friends or spouses. Therefore,
we needed a broader term that encompasses individuals that we would not normally consider to
be in our inner social circles (such as superiors at work, classmates, and co-workers).
Muslukhov et al. first identified the threat of the known adversary as an important and
pertinent one to the security of our authentication systems through the use of an online survey
conducted on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (n=724). 12% of survey participants indicated that
35
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they were aware of an instance where their devices/accounts have been breached by a known
adversary. 9% of survey participants indicated that they have actively engaged in breaching the
account/device of a known adversary.
Security research today accounts for the known adversary by recruiting participants to test
authentication systems in pairs. They often label the pair as being a weak or strong pair (or
strong and naive) [13, 34, 35, 39]. Security research often relies on the participants to self-declare
their relationship and base their classification on the declaration of participating pairs [13,34,35,39].
We believe that this is a flawed model because close/strong adversary pairs as labelled by social
parameters/norms are not always the only known adversaries to account for. In addition to that
it leaves the security research vulnerable to criticism because in some cases the pairs do not label
each other the same way (they see the relationship differently), that occurs when one participant
labels the relationship as a close one and the participant’s pair labels the relationship as not a very
close one. This has occurred before in security research [34]. This is what motivated our quest
to develop a model that formally quantifies the known adversary in an empirical manner to be
utilized within security research.
This model is highly important to all security research and specifically when geared towards
performing a security analysis on authentication systems that rely on autobiographical data, and
geographic authentication schemes. Autobiographical data specifically autobiographical location
data is naturally more susceptible to be common knowledge to known adversaries who are often in
close proximity to the potential victim. Geographical authentication schemes often rely on giving
hints or location cues that could make the credentials obvious to a known adversary [34].
The three most common fallback authentication mechanisms are security questions, email re-
sets, and SMS resets. Security questions are often low entropy and easy to guess [17, 31]. This
makes security questions highly vulnerable to an attack by a known adversary who has elevated
knowledge of a potential victim.
Email resets rely on the on the email account not being compromised and also rely on the device
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on which the email is setup to be secure. With many email reset implementations, the reset code
or reset link can be viewed from the lock screen (depending on the potential victim’s settings).
This also makes email resets highly vulnerable to a known adversary with elevated access to a
potential victim’s devices/accounts (e.g., a known adversary who is a co-worker spots a potential
victim’s phone lying on a desk while the potential victim is getting lunch). As for SMS resets they
also have the same flaw as email resets which make them highly susceptible to being compromised
by the known adversary.
This motivated us to create models for quantifying the known adversary and providing empirical
results as to whether or not this known adversary is indeed a threat. In this work we created three
different models to quantify the known adversary, based on relationship closeness metrics from the
field of Social Psychology [14,16,24].
In order to test these models, we performed a linear regression analysis corelating the scores
obtained by our models and the results that the participants obtained during the GeoSQ pair
guessing portion of our user study. We compared our models to the self-reported relationship
characterizations which we asked the participants in our user study to provide at the beginning
(during Session 1). In our study we attempt to determine whether or not our models to measure the
known adversary are better suited for quantifying the known adversary than simple self-declaration
by the pairs.
3.2 Designing Different Models
Our first model was based on the RCI [16]. We adapted the RCI to suit our needs because it
was developed in 1989 and it was not geared towards measuring the known adversary, it was geared
to measure relationship closeness broadly. In addition to that our way of life has changed since
1989 because of our increased use of technology. As a result, we added some more questions to
reflect our current way of life to create the adapted RCI model for measuring the known adversary.
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Refer to Appendix A for the original RCI, and refer to Appendix C for the adapted RCI that we
utilized in our study, the appendices also contain all the information regarding the scoring of all
the questions.
Our second model was based on the IoS Scale (Inclusion of the Other in the Self Scale) [14]. The
IoS Scale is a simple pictorial tool that allows participants to measure their relationship closeness
by selecting the image they believe best describes their relationship (see Appendix B).
We combined the IoS Scale with the We Scale [24]. The We Scale is a simple Likert Scale
question with seven levels that asks “Please, select the appropriate number below to indicate
to what extent you would use the term “WE” to characterize you and this individual” [24]. The
average of the We Scale and the IoS Scale provides us with what is known as the Oneness score [24].
The average of the We Scale and the IoS Scale (Oneness) is what we utilize for our second model
for a model to measure the known adversary.
The IoS Scale and the We Scale have both been positively corelated in providing accurate
relationship closeness metrics to the RCI by Gachter et al. [28]. The IoS Scale and the We Scale
provide the advantage of shortening the time it takes for researchers to conduct a survey since the
IoS Scale is a simple pictorial tool and the We Scale is a simple Likert Scale question.
Our third model to measure and quantify the known adversary is what we call the Known
Adversary Inventory (KAI). The KAI is composed of all the questions that were added to the RCI
to create the adapted RCI model (see Appendix C). This model was created for the purpose of
evaluating whether or not relationship closeness scales/inventories from the field of Social Psychol-
ogy are needed at all, because what we are trying to measure is not only relationship closeness but
proximity and threat posed to an authentication system in general, which can come from a variety
of sources (e.g., acquaintances, co-workers, spouses)
We compare the models created to measure and quantify the known adversary against the self-
declared relationship characterization provided by our participants. We perform this analysis in
an effort to compare the benefits of self-declaration of relationship characterizations versus having
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a formal model that quantifies the known adversary.
Our approach for the statistical analysis is to perform a linear regression analysis to discern
correlations between the models for measuring the known adversary and GeoSQ pair guessing
scores. We cannot perform the same type of linear regression analysis on GeoPassHints pair guess-
ing scores because, so few were successful therefore no positive correlation is possible. Our analysis
begins by calculating the correlation coefficient between the model and the GeoSQ pair guessing
scores. If the correlation coefficient was above 0.2 (the threshold for significance), we continued the
linear regression analysis to find key statistical values that prove a significant relationship exists
between the model and the GeoSQ pair guessing scores.
3.3 Results
In this section we will present the results of the linear regression analysis on each of our models,
in addition to the self-reported relationship characterization. Followed by that we will compare
the results of all the different models.
3.3.1 Adapted RCI (Model 1)
After performing a linear regression analysis on the guessing score of each participant and the
corresponding adapted RCI score, where the adapted RCI score was the predictor (x) and the
guessing score was what we were trying to predict (y); we attained a correlation of r=0.772 which
is well beyond our threshold for significance (set at 0.2)
Figure 3.1 shows a scatter plot where there appears to be a linear relationship between the
guessing score and the Adapted RCI score hence the positive correlation of r=0.772 attained.
Figure 3.2 features two boxplots that display the quartiles and the mean of both the GeoSQ
guessing score, and the adapted RCI score.
Figure 3.3 showcases a density plot for the adapted RCI scores and the GeoSQ guessing scores
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Figure 3.1: Scatter plot of guessing score/adapted RCI score that shows a linear relationship.
Figure 3.2: Boxplot for both the adapted RCI score and the GeoSQ guessing scores.
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with n =36 instead of n=34 (which is the total number of participants for Session 2) because this
graph includes one sided data were the participant’s pair did not have enough location data to
proceed with GeoSQ but was present for the guessing portion of the study, these two participants
with not enough location data are only included and mentioned in the portions of the study that
they participated in. We utilize the density plots in order to test for normality and the validity of
the analysis below.
Figure 3.3: Density plot for the adapted RCI score and the GeoSQ guessing results.
Table 3.1 showcases all the relevant statistical values. The null hypothesis is that the p value
will be zero which indicates no relationship between the two variables. Our alternative hypothesis
is that there exists a relationship which ideally means our p value will be lower than our pre-
determined level of significant which is p < 0.05. Our attained p value using an independent
t-test is 3.472e−8 which is significantly lower than 0.05 and is higher than zero therefore we can
confidently reject the null hypothesis.
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The t value is another important statistical figure because the higher the t value the less likely
it is that the reported results are not zero by chance. Our reported t value as shown in Table 3.1
is 7.087 which indicates that it is not likely the p value and correlation coefficient is not zero by
chance.
Our residual standard error for this analysis was 1.362 on 34 degrees of freedom. Our calculated
multiple r2 was 0.596 and our adjusted r2 was 0.584. The r2 value gives us the proportion of
variation in the GeoSQ guessing result which in this case is y or dependent variable that we
attempt to correlate with the adapted RCI result. The adjusted r2 will penalize the analysis based
on the total number of adapted RCI variables (independent variables). This is standard practice
because larger sets can be set up to have large r2 values, therefore we rely on the adjusted r2.
Furthermore, we utilize two more measures of goodness fit in order to compare different models,
because it is considered a best practice to not completely ignore models based on the r2 and the
adjusted r2. The first is Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) [10] and the second is Bayesian
information criterion (BIC) [45]. The lower the AIC and BIC are the better, and both measures
of good fit rely on a maximized value of likelihood function as shown in the formulas below. Our
reported AIC and BIC are 128.368 and 133.119
AIC=(−2) × ln(L) + (2 × k), L is the likelihood function, and k is the number of parameters.
BIC= (−2) × ln(L) + k × ln(n), n is the sample size.
Correlation p t Standard Degrees of r2 Adjusted AIC BIC
Coefficient r Value Value Error Freedom r2
0.772 3.472e−8 7.087 1.362 34 0.596 0.584 128.368 133.119
Table 3.1: Relevant statistical figures for adapted RCI model.
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3.3.2 Oneness Score (Model 2)
We performed the same analysis for the second model which is utilizing Oneness scores instead
of the adapted RCI score. The correlation coefficient was weak at r=0.0966. This value does not
merit further statistical analysis with the Oneness score being the independent (predictor) variable.
Figure 3.4 shows the scatter plot of the Oneness scores and the GeoSQ guessing scores.
Figure 3.4: Scatter plot of GeoSQ guessing scores and Oneness Scores obtained by the participants.
3.3.3 KAI (Model 3)
After performing an initial analysis on the KAI we obtained a high correlation value of r=
0.729 which is statistically significant and warrants a full linear regression analysis. Figure 3.5
showcases the scatterplot of the guessing scores against the results of the KAI.
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Figure 3.5: Scatterplot of the KAI model and GeoSQ guessing score that shows a linear relation-
ship.
Figure 3.6 features two boxplots that displays the quartiles and the mean of both the guessing
score and the KAI score.
Figure 3.6: Boxplot for both the KAI score, and the GeoSQ guessing score.
Figure 3.7 showcases the density plot, as mentioned earlier the density plot is n=36 instead
of n=34 because of two participants who did not have enough location data to continue with the
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GeoSQ portion of the study.
Figure 3.7: Density plot for KAI scores and GeoSQ guessing scores.
Correlation p t Standard Degrees of r2 Adjusted AIC BIC
Coefficient r Value Value Error Freedom r2
0.728 4.703e−8 6.203 1.469 34 0.530 0.517 133.774 138.525
Table 3.2: Relevant statistical figures for KAI model.
The statistical figures in Table 3.2 show us that even without the RCI component, the questions
we added to the adapted RCI are also good predictors for a participant’s guessing ability.
3.3.4 Self-Reported Relationship Characterization
In order to prove that utilizing a model for measuring the known adversary is indeed more
useful we also perform the same analysis on the self-reported relationship characterizations and
CHAPTER 3. MODELS FOR QUANTIFYING THE KNOWN ADVERSARY 46
GeoSQ guessing scores. We obtained a negative correlation coefficient of -0.068, which is well
below the threshold of significance that was set at 0.2.
The self-reported relationship characterization was split across four levels that participants
could choose from. The first level was no relationship, the second level was not very close, the
third level was close, the fourth level was very close. Of the 17 pairs that successfully completed
all part of Session 1 and Session 2, there were seven instances in which the participant pairs self-
reported their relationship characterization differently. All the differences were one level apart,
meaning that it was typically a participant who picked a similar but different value from their
pair.
As a result of the low correlation coefficient, further statistical analysis is not merited in this
case, Figure 3.8 shows the relationship of the self-reported relationship with the GeoSQ scores.
Figure 3.8: Scatterplot of the self-reported relationship characterization and the GeoSQ guessing
scores that shows no clear relationship.
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3.4 Comparison
Two models that quantify the known adversary stood out, the KAI and the adapted RCI.
The self-reported relationship characterization was shown to have a negative correlation with the
GeoSQ guessing scores, and the Oneness score has a low correlation with the GeoSQ guessing scores
which makes both the Oneness score and the self-reported relationship characterization ineffective
in quantifying the known adversary.
Out of the two successful models that have been proven to be adequate predictors of the ability
of a pair to obtain high results on the GeoSQ guessing score, the adapted RCI seemed to be the
best predictor. However, the margin between the adapted RCI and the KAI was very small. We
attribute this closeness in correlation between those two models and the GeoSQ guessing scores to
the fact that the original RCI portion of the adapted RCI model was geared towards relationship
influence (see Appendix C), which is strictly a relationship closeness metric and not necessarily
pertinent to measuring and quantifying the known adversary as proven by the analysis. That is
why we did not discuss the analysis of the RCI portion of the adapted RCI like we did with the
KAI. While the RCI portion of the adapted RCI provided a slight improvement on the original
portion of the adapted RCI on its lonesome did not have a significant correlation.
When comparing the statistical figures obtained by the adapted RCI model and the KAI model,
the difference is very small with the adapted RCI showing a slight advantage in terms of goodness
of fit when we performed the full linear regression analysis. Table 3.3 compares the statistical
figures obtained by the adapted RCI and the KAI. The AIC and BIC of the adapted RCI are only
slightly lower (meaning they are a better fit) than the KAI.
This has ramifications because one of the issues with security research is the time burden placed
on the participants by extremely long questionnaires therefore shortening them is always welcome.
More importantly, this leads to the conclusion that perhaps social closeness metrics might not be
pertinent when quantifying the known adversary, because the known adversary is not always an
individual we consider as close to us from a social perspective.
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p Value 3.472e−8 4.703e−7








Adjusted r2 0.584 0.517
AIC 128.368 133.774
BIC 133.118 138.525
Table 3.3: Side by side comparison of statistical figures obtained from the linear regression analysis
of the adapted RCI model and the KAI model.
To account for the fact that we ran two tests on the same GeoSQ guessing scores data set
which increases the chance that we obtained these results by coincidence; we perform a Bonferroni
correction [9] which adjusts the level of significance from 0.05 to 0.025. Since the p values are
considerably below that threshold, this does not affect the validity of our result.
3.5 Limitations and Future Work
The successful models for quantifying the known adversary are the KAI and the adapted-RCI.
However, since they have only been tested using GeoPassHints and GeoSQ there is a question
regarding their adaptability and the ability for us to claim that they can be utilized on any
fallback authentication or primary authentication method.
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The different models were designed in a way that should be more successful in measuring the
ability of a known adversary to guess autobiographical authentication questions and geographical
authentication questions. This is true because we are often measuring physical proximity by
asking the questions in the model. Therefore, we cannot say that the models can be generalized
for utilization in all research with a known adversary or insider threat aspect.
We stress that we are not only measuring relationship closeness, we are only trying to measure
whether or not a pair in a research study is a truly strong known adversary to be able to evaluate
our authentication systems to a more valid extent.
Future work should discuss the applicability of the two successful models to other methods of
primary and fallback authentication. In addition to that another valid extension of this work would
be altering the actual weights that have been utilized within the models. For example, we have a
question on fettered and unfettered access to a pair’s device. These questions are weighted more
than other questions regarding proximity due to the fact that a simple answer to these questions
is adequate in determining whether a pair is a true and strong known adversary that is able to
guess and answer many verification questions successfully. Adjusting the weights and attempting
to yield different results could alter the effectiveness of the models to either be even more successful
in predicting whether a certain pair is a strong or weak known adversary and it could also alter
the effectiveness of these models negatively.
Another extension of this work would be to break down the models into individual questions




In spite of their tremendous security flaws the most common fallback authentication mecha-
nisms (security questions, Email resets, and SMS resets) continue to be used by many verifiers
today. The three most common fallback authentication mechanisms are in use due to their per-
ceived usability and less so for their proven security [18,31,34]. The more usable an authentication
mechanism is, the more it tends to lack security. Highly secure authentication mechanisms on the
other hand tend to be less usable. The perfect authentication mechanism is one that balances us-
ability and security. Ideally, an authentication mechanism will bridge the chasm between usability
and security.
Secure policies that make authentication mechanisms more secure are often not adopted to
allow for increased usability. For example, we could set password policies that mandate a minimum
length requirement of 16 characters. However, the longer the password, the less memorable it tends
to be [46]. This is just an example of how usability and the relative security an authentication
system provides, will ultimately decide whether or not an authentication mechanism is widely
adopted.
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In recent years, we have seen a push towards creating alternative fallback authentication mech-
anisms that replace traditional commonly utilized fallback authentication mechanisms due to the
security flaws present within security questions, email resets, and SMS resets. One such alternative
fallback mechanism relies on autobiographical data in order to generate questions that the legiti-
mate user can answer in order to gain access to an account/device [13,34]. Authentication systems
utilizing autobiographical data tend to take longer to authenticate because more than one ques-
tion is typically asked of the legitimate user. This makes systems utilizing autobiographical data
unusable for primary authentication (i.e., entering a password) because primary authentication
occurs far more often than fallback authentication [18]. As a result, autobiographical authenti-
cation systems are typically only thought of as replacements to current fallback authentication
mechanisms.
In this work, we design and implement from scratch, an autobiographical authentication system
called GeoSQ (geographical security questions), a variant of Albayram et al’s and Hang et al’s
previously proposed autobiographical authentication systems [13, 34], and we test our system for
security, usability, and deployability.
This chapter is organized as follows; we begin by introducing the system design. Followed by
that we complete our security, usability, and deployability analysis utilizing data from our user
study, and using the framework developed by Bonneau at al. [18] as a guide to our analysis. Lastly,
we present our resulting system and policy recommendations, followed by a discussion and future
work section.
4.2 GeoSQ System Design
GeoSQ is an Android application developed with the help of the Google Maps API [4] that
utilizes autobiographical location data logged over 7 to 11 days. The user presses on the screen
for 1.5 seconds in order to set a point when prompted with the question. Users of GeoSQ have the
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option of switching between satellite and terrain mode and have the ability to search the Google
map in order to aid them in finding the location where they were present when prompted with
the question. Users of GeoSQ also have the option of clicking on the current location button and
are then zoomed in to their current location (requires location services to be activated). Lastly,
the users can zoom in and zoom out as they please. Figure 4.1 features screenshots of the GeoSQ
interface.
Figure 4.1: GeoSQ Interface
4.2.1 GeoSQ System Design and Development Details
GeoSQ was designed in an agile development environment where development was simultane-
ously conducted with pilot testing, followed by more editing and development to come up with
the final user interface and system settings. In the development of GeoSQ many usability/security
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tradeoffs had to be made, and many changes had to be made to account for the resource restricted
environment an application like GeoSQ would run on (a smartphone with limited battery).
One of the biggest concerns faced when developing Android phone applications is ensuring that
the application does not consume a great amount of battery. That is one of the first system design
tradeoff between security and usability that we encountered. If we set the location accuracy to be
too high and if we set it to refresh the location too often it would waste too much battery and
hence make it less usable. On the other hand, it would make the location more accurate and hence
the error margin would be less, and therefore it would be more secure because the sample space
would be larger.
The accuracy of the Google Maps API does depend on how modern the phone is and what
software is being run, but in the pilot testing with the location accuracy set to balanced power
accuracy [4] we observed an accuracy similar to the documentation of about 2 blocks or roughly
200-400 meters. Balanced power accuracy is the middle ground in terms of accuracy; this setting
does not completely favor saving battery power, but it balances saving battery power with obtaining
the most accurate location possible. When testing on older smartphones running older versions of
Android the same location accuracy setting gave us an accuracy of roughly 400 meters depending
on whether we were connected to Wi-Fi or not. We decided to maintain the settings on balanced
power accuracy and set the error margin to 400 meters which decreases the sample space, but
saves power and makes the application more usable.
As mentioned earlier, the frequency of the refresh rate will also have an effect on the battery
life. We set the refresh to be every one minute and we were able to make the battery life usage
very efficient. Other system settings for GeoSQ include a minimum of a five-minute stay at any
location in order to ensure that it would be memorable (and to ensure it was not a stop in traffic
for example). In addition to that, we implemented a five-hour maximum stay at any one place to
avoid obvious guesses such as work or home; this is another usability security trade off however,
in this case we elected to have higher security and less usability.
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We had several security, usability, and deployability goals in mind when creating GeoSQ. Our
primary goals were enshrined in ensuring an authentication system that is more secure than current
fallback authentication systems in use, in addition to ensuring that the system is highly memorable
and usable. After the usability analysis was conducted it became obvious that the memorability
of the system is a major issue as well as the time required to login. Both of these usability issues
were not observed during pilot testing to the extent that they were in the actual user study. As
for the deployability of the system, we were not as concerned about that because the deployability
of an authentication system often comes after its adoption and maturity.
The greatest usability/security tradeoff came from our decision to only record unique locations.
This greatly improves the security of the system because without this feature, adversaries can
simply guess home or work depending on the timing and in less busy weeks, and especially in
a university environment it would be an extremely successful guessing strategy. The usability
tradeoff is that some participants did not have ten unique locations at the end of a week, so we
extended the allowed timespan from anywhere between 7-11 days. Six individuals (2 of them
are the researchers and four family members, and friends) pilot tested the application with and
without the unique location requirement and we found that it made it more memorable to have
the unique location requirement in 4/6 pilot testers. It had no negative impact on memorability
for the other two pilot testers.
The default zoom level was zoom level 16 and it was concentrated over the current location; if
the participant/user clicked on the current location button the map view would zoom in to level
14 and put the focus on the current location. The error margin was irrespective of the zoom level
since we were using spherical distance to computer the distance between two coordinates that will
mean the more zoomed in the more accurate the market placement. Participants were encouraged
to zoom in and set the marker as accurately as they can remember.
Other settings and system design features that are worthy of mentioning are the minimum
displacement which we set to be 200 meters before it is considered a unique location or before a
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location was recorded. This means that, for example, a movement from one class to another in the
same building would not be recorded as a new unique location (unless it was a really large building).
In order to calculate the distance from one pair of coordinates to another, we utilized spherical
distance, which measures the most direct line irrespective of buildings and paths to actually get
to a location.
The last system design specification that is worthy of mentioning is the order in which questions
are presented. We utilized a last in first out algorithm to extract the questions from the database.
This was done to measure the effect of time on memorability on location autobiographical data.
We had no access to the actual locations just whether or not the answer was correct and the time
it took to answer the question.
4.3 Results
In this section, we will present our analysis of our autobiographical authentication system
GeoSQ. The analysis will be split into three different broad categories: 1- security, 2-usability, 3-
deployability. Our analysis will be based on the criteria laid out by the Bonneau et al. framework
for the comparative evaluation of authentication systems [18]. See Section 2.8 for a detailed
description of each subcategory.
We added two more subcategories to the framework originally developed by Bonneau et al.
[18]. The two categories that we added are Resilient-to-Social-Media-Mining and Resilient-to-the-
Known-Adversary.
A system is awarded being Resilient-to-Social-Media-Mining if social media mining cannot
provide an attacker with a leg up in guessing the user’s authentication information. We award an
authentication system this feature if social media mining does not improve the attacker’s ability to
guess by more than 1%. An authentication system is awarded the accolade of being Resilient-to-the-
Known-Adversary if any attacker with elevated access to a user’s devices and elevated knowledge of
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the user cannot compromise the system. To be more specific, a throttled known adversary should
not be able to compromise more than 1% of accounts protected by the authentication system given
10 guesses a day for 365 days.
4.3.1 Security
Resilient-to-Physical-Observation
GeoSQ is considered to be Resilient-to-Physical-Observation since an attacker cannot reason-
ably successfully impersonate a user after observing them authenticate one or more times. The
questions asked by GeoSQ are autobiographic which means that they will change over time. Also,
once a question is asked, our system design marks the question as used and it cannot be asked
again. In this case, physical observation of the user by the attacker would have to be constant
over the past 7-11 days (the timeframe required to gather 10 unique locations).
Resilient-to-Targeted-Impersonation
Resilience to targeted impersonation involves being resilient to attacks that exploit personal
details [18]. In the case of GeoSQ, which relies on location autobiographical information paired
with our parameters put into place (the unique location requirement); an attacker with knowledge
of personal details such is the place of work, and the home of the victim would only be able to
score 2/10 within our system. However, more advanced targeted impersonation could reasonably
attain high scores within GeoSQ therefore we award GeoSQ the perk of almost having the benefit
of being Resilient-to-Targeted-Impersonation. We added another column to account for the known
adversary specifically because targeted impersonation can be conducted by a stranger, while a
known adversary is any individual who knows the potential victim on some level and has physical
access to their devices and possibly accounts.
CHAPTER 4. GEOSQ 57
Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing
According to Bonneau et al. [18], a system is awarded being Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing if
an attacker, while being constrained by a verifier, cannot compromise more than 1% of accounts
a year given ten guesses a day. In our analysis, 34% of the location questions were answered
correctly by the pairs when attempting to guess each other’s locations. With our threshold of 7
correct answers out of 10, 11% of participants were able to successfully guess their pair’s locations.
Since the participant pairs knew each other it is expected that they would be able to guess more
successfully than a typical throttled guessing attack that does not involve an individual that knows
the potential victim. That is why this will be analyzed in the Resilient-to-the-Known-Adversary
category that we added.
One feature that can assist against throttled guessing attacks by an unknown adversary on
GeoSQ is the changing target, since autobiographical location data is dynamic, it would be difficult
given a robust system design and a high enough threshold for a throttled attacker to be able to
compromise an account, the attacker only gets one chance at answering questions correctly. Our
GeoSQ system design does not allow for multiple guesses for each location question. Instead, the
ten questions are asked, then each of these questions will never be reused again. In order for the
attacker to try again, he/she would have to wait for the participant to generate new location data.
This is a usability burden to the legitimate user who does not answer the questions correctly,
therefore the legitimate user might need an alternative method of fallback authentication.
Therefore, since the criteria of being Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing does not directly apply to
GeoSQ (due to the fact that the location questions will change, and it is not possible to conduct
that kind of guessing attack) we grant GeoSQ the accolade of being Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing.
Resilient-to-Unthrottled-Guessing
According to Bonneau et al. [18] a system is Resilient-to-Unthrottled-Guessing if an attacker
with the ability to guess 240 per account is only able to compromise 1% or less of the accounts.
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Based on that metric, GeoSQ would be Resilient-to-Unthrottled-Guessing.
The sample space for autobiographical location data paired with an error threshold of a 400-
meter radius is very low (140,625). However, it is high when we factor in the threshold of 7
correct location answers. While calculating the sample space, we made the assumption that most
participants will be within an hour and a half of a central home location at any time within
the week. Therefore, we can assume a radius of 150 kilometers which is around 70,685 square
kilometers. Our error radius is 400 meters which is 0.50265 km2. Dividing 70,685 km2 by 0.50265
km2 yields us 140,625 unique locations.
Lastly, we assume that the threshold is 7 locations answered correctly out of 10. Therefore, our
sample space is 140,625 choose 7 (2107.411) which would not easily be guessable by an unthrottled
attacker. We do not have access to the actual location therefore we cannot run an empirical test
that guesses the locations logged on our participants’ smartphones.
Resilient-to-Internal-Observation
According to Bonneau et al. [18], an authentication mechanism is Resilient-to-Internal-Observation
if the attacker cannot impersonate the legitimate user by intercepting the legitimate user’s input.
An example of internal observation would be key logging or recording the screen of the legiti-
mate user and relaying to an attacker’s computer. Based on those parameters, GeoSQ is indeed
Resilient-to-Internal-Observation to a high extent. GeoSQ relies on autobiographical location data,
hence even if there was the threat of an internal observer, the questions would change over time
and information gathered from one observation couldn’t be reused in an attack.
Resilient-to-Leaks-from-other-Verifiers
A system is classified as Resilient-to-Leaks-from-other-Verifiers ; if anything, another verifier
leak could potentially help an attacker impersonate a legitimate user [18]. In the case of GeoSQ,
even if there was a leak of a popular verifier such as Google Maps for example, assuming the leak
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is not ongoing; we would classify GeoSQ as being resilient to leaks from other verifiers.
However, if the leak is ongoing, GeoSQ would not be Resilient-to-Leaks-from-other-Verifiers.
It is important to note that even with an ongoing leak it would be difficult to match the metrics
since it is possible that not all the locations in your Google Timeline will be recorded by a system
utilizing GeoSQ.
Resilient-to-Phishing
GeoSQ can be classified as Resilient-to-Phishing because it utilizes autobiographical location
data which changes over time. In order for a classical phishing attack to be successful on the GeoSQ
system, it would have to assume that a legitimate verifier utilizing GeoSQ as their authentication
scheme will have the exact same questions as the phishing attack. The phishing attack would also
have to happen right away and would have to have the exact timestamps utilized by the legitimate
verifier. Since that is very unlikely, we assert that GeoSQ is resilient to phishing attacks. Please
note that Resilient-to-Phishing does not consider relay style man in the middle attacks, which
GeoSQ would be vulnerable to.
Resilient-to-Theft
This category is pertinent for authentication mechanisms that rely on a physical object for
authentication, such as a magnetized card or a hardware token. In the case of GeoSQ, a physical
object is required for authentication (a smartphone). Without the assumption that a smartphone is
on the user’s person at all times, it is infeasible to collect autobiographical location data. However,
even if the smartphone was stolen, it would have to remain on for a great amount of time to collect
location data. During this time a smartphone is usually traceable. Therefore, in the case of an
untraceable smartphone, GeoSQ is not Resilient-to-Theft but is Resilient-to-Theft in the case of a
traceable smartphone.
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No-Trusted-Third-Party
This feature is awarded to systems that only rely on the user and verifier [18]. In the case
of GeoSQ, it is unreasonable to assume that every verifier will have their own location logging
software. Therefore, a third party would most likely be required. Hence, GeoSQ is not awarded
this feature.
Requiring-Explicit-Consent
This feature is awarded to systems that require the user to initiate an authentication. It is re-
garded as a security and privacy feature [18]. GeoSQ requires explicit consent for an authentication
process to begin, hence it is awarded this feature.
Unlinkable
An authentication system is classified as Unlinkable if a set of colluding systems cannot deter-
mine from the authenticator whether or not it is belongs to the same user on multiple different
platforms [18]. In this case, since GeoSQ relies on a trusted third party, it would be classified as
linkable. Hence it is not awarded this feature.
Resilient-to-Social-Media-Mining
This category is an addition to the original framework proposed by Bonneau et al. [18]. A
system is awarded this feature if social media mining cannot provide an attacker with a leg up in
guessing the user’s authentication information. We award an authentication system this feature if
social media mining does not improve the attacker’s ability to guess by more than one percent.
In our study, we attempted to gauge the effect of social media mining on the participants
ability to guess the pair’s locations. In our adapted RCI framework (see Appendix C), we asked
the participants if they follow their pairs on social media platforms, and whether or not they
see frequent location posts. The results showed that out of the 38 participants (19 pairs) that
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conducted session 1, all of the pairs followed each other on social media. When asked on how
many different mediums, the average was 2.67 per participant. Even though a pair might follow
each other on social media that does not mean that they are active, therefore we asked how many
posts per week do you does your pair make? The average was 3.05 posts per week. After that we
asked how many location posts your pair makes per week the average for that question was 1.62.
This data is very important because it shows how pervasive social media mining can be when
used as a tool by the attacker. Based on the threshold we set (7/10), and the average number of
location posts per week (1.62), we estimate that social media mining will not provide an attacker
a significant advantage. Hence GeoSQ is Resilient-to-Social-Media-Mining.
Resilient-to-the-Known-Adversary
Resilient-to-the-Known-Adversary is another category that we appended to the originally pro-
posed Bonneau et al. Framework. An authentication system is awarded the accolade of being
resilient to the known adversary if any attacker with elevated access to a user’s devices and el-
evated knowledge of the user cannot compromise the system. To be more specific, a throttled
known adversary should not be able to compromise more than 1% of accounts protected by the
authentication system given 10 guesses a day for 365 days.
Since the known adversary is often a throttled adversary, that leads to the question, what are
the optimal throttling settings? In addition to; what are the thresholds that we should use for
authentication? When utilizing passwords, or security questions the answer is simply an exact
character match. However, in more complex systems such as GeoSQ for example there are several
thresholds that we could utilize for authentication.
As mentioned earlier, in our study we asked the participants to answer ten location questions
gathered over a period of 7-11 days. In order to determine what the optimal number threshold for
a successful authentication is (correct answers to autobiographical location questions out of 10) we
conducted an analysis on the data to determine the true positive rate and the false positive rate
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in the form of a Receiving Operator Characteristics graph (see Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.2: ROC graph showcasing the effect the threshold will have on the FPR and the TPR.
As mentioned earlier, according to the ROC graph the resilience to the known adversary de-
pends solely on the threshold set. At a threshold of 7/10 correct questions, the false positive rate
(FPR) is very low but so is the true positive rate (TPR), which is a preview on the memorability
(to be discussed in the usability analysis). The TPR improves when the threshold is set to six, but
the issue is that by then the FPR is close to 15% which is much higher than 1% of all accounts; the
threshold we set for an authentication system to be considered resilient to the known adversary.
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Therefore, GeoSQ is not Resilient-to-the-Known-Adversary.
4.3.2 Usability
Memorywise-Effortless
In order for an authentication system to be considered Memorywise-Effortless it must not
require a user to remember any secret at all [18]. A system is rewarded with the status of being
Quasi-Memorywise-Effortless if there is only one secret to remember for all verifiers [18]
Based on those parameters GeoSQ is considered to not be Quasi-Memorywise-Effortless or
Memorywise-Effortless because more than one secret is required for all verifiers. The secret (the
location) is also not stagnant and multiple questions are required based on our system design.
Scalable-for-Users
An authentication system is considered Scalable-for-Users if using the authentication system
for many accounts does not put any extra burden on the user [18]. For example, if a user is asked
to set multiple passwords across different verifiers, then as the number of accounts increase, the
burden on the user is increasing.
Based on those parameters, GeoSQ is considered Scalable-for-Users because it does not increase
the burden on the users as the number of accounts that utilize GeoSQ increase. For a specific
timeframe, the same locations would have to be utilized. In addition to that, since the location
being collected is autobiographic, all the user has to do is go on with normal life instead of having
to register authentication credentials.
Nothing-to-Carry
This category is awarded to authentication systems that do not require the user to carry
anything to be able to authenticate. Some systems require a physical card to be present for
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authentication, these systems would not be granted the Nothing-to-Carry accolade [18]. Moreover,
an authentication system is given the status of Quasi-Nothing-to-Carry if the user will carry this
device anyway (i.e., a smartphone) [18]. Based on these parameters GeoSQ would be granted the
status of Quasi-Nothing-to-Carry.
Physically-Effortless
This category is granted to authentication systems that do not require the user to perform any
action past the pressing of a button (to indicate authentication is occurring i.e., submit) [18].
Based on that definition, GeoSQ would not be considered physically effortless. The data
collection process, which is equivalent to setting your credentials, is physically effortless (users are
typically moving around with their smartphone anyway). However, the process of authentication
requires the user to utilize the map and click to set a marker, rendering the system not Physically-
Effortless.
Easy-to-Learn
In order to determine if the system was Easy-to-Learn and easy to use, we followed up the
usage of the systems during Session 2 of our user study and asked a series of usability questions,
including the following two Likert Scale questions: 1- I thought the system was easy to use, 2- I
thought the system was easy to learn how to use. The users were asked to indicate the extent in
which they agreed with those statements on a scale of 1 to 7.
Figure 4.3 shows the responses to the GeoSQ system. 65% agreed, strongly agreed, or very
strongly agreed that the GeoSQ system was easy to use. 11% of our participants were neutral and
26% either disagreed, strongly disagreed, or very strongly disagreed. As for the second question
79% agreed, strongly agreed, or very strongly agreed that the system was easy to learn how to use.
6% of our participants were neutral and 26% very strongly disagreed). Based on that we grant
GeoSQ the accolade of being Easy to Use and easy to learn how to use.
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Figure 4.3: Usability Likert Scale questions - GeoSQ
Efficient-to-Use
In order to an authentication system to be considered Efficient-to-Use the time spent for
each authentication must be acceptably short [18], the time required for a user to set up his/her
credentials with a verifier should also be reasonable [18]. Bonneau et al. do not specify empirical
values for this category which is appropriate because of the variety of authentication systems and
the variety of intended use. For example, a smartphone would be more secure with an 8-character
PIN; however, it is unusable for that target environment because a user typically wants to access
the smartphone quickly.
Since GeoSQ does not really require the user to set their authentication credentials, it scores
well in that half of this category. Figure 4.4 shows the login times per question, Figure 4.5 shows
the average login time for all participants for all ten questions.
The most noticeable outlier is Q1 which has an average that is far higher than the other
questions. Since we utilized a last in first out algorithm when deciding the order of the questions
that are displayed to the participant, we know that Q1 was the most recent location that was
logged. However, despite that the login time for that specific question appears to be a lot higher,
we expected the login time for that specific question to be the lowest because it is the most recent.
During our user study, we observed that the participants tended to fiddle around and get used to
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Figure 4.4: Average login time for GeoSQ for each question. Three outliers standing at 12:00
the
Figure 4.5: Average login time for GeoSQ for all ten questions.
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interface in question one which explains the finding. The general trend after question one is a
decreasing login time, this suggests that the users are becoming more familiar with the interface.
GeoSQ cannot be classified as Efficient-to-Use due to the high login time.
Infrequent-Errors
An authentication system may be awarded in the Infrequent-Errors category if the login task
typically succeeds when performed by the true user [18]. In the case of GeoSQ, since it is not
only one question being answered, this category will depend on the user correctly answering a
certain number of questions greater than the system threshold. Figure 4.6 showcases the number
of correct/incorrect responses for all 34 participants of Session 2. Figure 4.7 showcases the average
correct responses for each user.
According to the Figure 4.7, the average correct response is 5.06, which is just slightly higher
than 50% of the questions asked. Recall that the participants were asked ten unique autobiograph-
ical location questions each. The participants were not allowed to attempt answering the same
autobiographical location question if it was answered incorrectly, but they were simply moved to
the next question.
The results indicate a dangerous trend to the security and usability of the system.
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Figure 4.6: Total number of correct and incorrect responses per question, by legitimate users.
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Figure 4.7: Correct responses by legitimate users.
Figure 4.2 showcases the ROC graph that determines the false positive rate and the true
positive rate for each threshold. Given the number of incorrect answers in order to make this
system usable for 61% of users, we must set the threshold to 5 correct answers out of 10. However,
the risk becomes the security concern because at that threshold, the false positive rate is about
24% (n=34, 17 pairs).
As a result of the frequent errors and the need to decrease the threshold to an extent that
would compromise GeoSQ’s security, we do not consider GeoSQ to have Infrequent-Errors. Which
was a surprising result given the promising results we obtained during pilot testing.
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Easy-Recovery-from-Loss
This category rewards authentication systems that make it easy to recover from loss. However,
in the case of GeoSQ, should it be deployed for the purpose of fallback authentication, then it
would not be easy to recover from loss. Our implementation of this autobiographical location-
based system is based upon the fact that the user will have at least ten unique locations to be
queried about. That typically does take a significant period of time to accumulate (many of our
participants did not have ten unique locations at the end of seven days so we had to extend the
range to 11 days). Should GeoSQ fail as a fallback authentication system for a legitimate user, it
would not be feasible to wait until the user has a set of new questions. Therefore, GeoSQ would
not be easy to recover from loss.
4.3.3 Participant Preferences, Attitudes, and Concerns
This section will encompass other usability dimensions for GeoSQ that are not part for the
Bonneau et al. Framework [18]. At the end of Session 2, we asked participants to fill out an exit
survey for GeoSQ; which asked usability, preference, and concern questions in order to determine
how the participants viewed the GeoSQ system. All of the questions were Likert Scale questions
ranging from 1 to 7.
We begin by analyzing the data we collected for GeoSQ. After the two ease of use/ease of learn-
ing questions are asked (refer to Section 4.3.5 Figure 4.3 for the results), we asked the participants
if they wrote anything down or recorded any information that helped them use this system. None
of them indicated that they recorded anything manually/electronically or wrote anything down,
but one participant did indicate that they used an online service that logs locations and associated
times to attempt to remember the answers to the location questions asked.
Followed by that we ask: For a mobile device’s forgotten password/PIN or failed biometric, to
what extent would you prefer to use this system (GeoSQ) in lieu of any of the following fallback
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authentication methods? Figure 4.8 showcases the results.
Figure 4.8: For a mobile device’s forgotten password/PIN or failed biometric, to what extent would
you prefer to use this system in lieu of any of the following fallback authentication methods?
Figure 4.8 shows that the participants were split on the issue of utilizing GeoSQ. With the ma-
jority leaning towards neutral or negative in lieu of any of the fallback authentication mechanisms
mentioned above.
Next, we asked the participants: For an online account’s forgotten password, to what extent
would you prefer to use this system in lieu of any of the following fallback authentication methods?
Figure 4.9 showcases the results.
Figure 4.9: For an online account’s forgotten password, to what extent would you prefer to use
this system in lieu of any of the following fallback authentication methods?
Based on Figure 4.9, the results once again tend to favor the negative and neutral answers
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with an equal 47 percent of the answers being positive across all three types of popular fallback
authentication techniques. This suggests a certain frustration with the time it took, during the
user studies we observed that many participants would really try hard to remember their locations
to no avail.
Lastly, we asked three more questions to gauge the concerns that the participants might have
while utilizing an authentication system that utilizes sensitive location data. We asked three
questions. 1 If you were to use this system, how likely do you think it is that someone you know
could access your device/accounts without consent? 2- To what extent are you concerned of a
privacy leak as a result of applications utilizing location services (e.g., Google Locations, GeoSQ,
etc.)? 3- How concerned are you about a privacy leak on any medium (e.g. Facebook, contact
information, pictures)? Figure 4.10 showcases the responses attained from the participants in the
study.
Figure 4.10: 1-If you were to use this system, how likely do you think it is that someone you know
could access your device/accounts without consent? 2- To what extent are you concerned of a
privacy leak as a result of applications utilizing location services (e.g., Google Locations, GeoSQ,
etc.)? 3- How concerned are you about a privacy leak on any medium (e.g. Facebook, contact
information, pictures)?
Figure 4.10 shows that most participants are not concerned about a breach caused by a known
adversary, should GeoSQ be utilized to secure their devices/accounts. Only 18% of participants
voiced a concern that GeoSQ could lead to a known adversary accessing their devices/accounts
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without consent. The concern for a privacy leak on any medium was also considerably low; only
41% of participants were either somewhat concerned, concerned, or highly concerned. Lastly, only
38% of participants were somewhat concerned, concerned, or highly concerned of a privacy leak as
a result of application utilizing locations services. These figures are surprisingly low when taking
into account the number of leaks and privacy breaches that have garnered media attention in the
recent past.
Overall, there seems to be a reluctance by most participants when it comes to using GeoSQ in
lieu of other forms of fallback authentication, and participants seem to oppose an authentication
scheme such as GeoSQ to access their accounts/devices.
4.3.4 Deployability
Accessibility
The Android environment has several accessibility features that allow individuals who are
differently able to use Google Maps [1]. We utilized the Google Maps API in order to develop
GeoSQ. Therefore, the accessibility features offered are compatible with GeoSQ. On Android OS
BrailleBack, TalkBack, Voice Access help are offered readily in many different distributions of the
Android OS.
It is important to note that only certain devices offer the BrailleBack feature [1] and not all
common devices offer this feature which is designed for individuals who have visual impairments
and more specifically individuals that have visual and hearing impairments simultaneously. As a
result of the Google Accessibility Suite we reward GeoSQ with the benefit of being accessible with
one caveat regarding the speed of use. Individuals that are differently able will realistically require
more time to use GeoSQ.
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Negligible-Cost-per-User
GeoSQ is awarded in the Negligible-Cost-per-User category because implementing the system
is possible with open and free to use APIs hence the burden on a verifier implementing such a
system does not go up when the system is scaled to many users.
Server-Compatible
GeoSQ is not server compatible, because the definition of being server compatible in that
category is not having the verifier significantly change their existing authentication settings, and
the authentication system must be compatible with text-based passwords from the point of view
of the verifier. GeoSQ would require significant edits made to the backend to make both these
authentication systems work.
Browser-Compatible
GeoSQ is not designed for a browser environment, therefore this category does not pertain to
it. It is however possible to implement a version of GeoSQ that is compatible with many modern
browsers. Any modern browser that supports the Google Maps API would be able to run a browser
based GeoSQ.
Mature
GeoSQ is not a mature authentication system, this category is gauged towards authentication
systems that have already been implemented widely. GeoSQ is simply an authentication system
we designed and implemented for testing purposes that has not been tested for a long period of
time on a wide scale.
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Nonproprietary
GeoSQ is not patented in an yway and the technology behind it (Google Maps API) is free and
open to use with alternatives to this API being readily available (though not as good).
Table 4.1 shows the full system evaluation according to the Bonneau et al. framework [18]
in addition to our two added categories, and compares GeoSQ to passwords, security questions,
Email resets, and SMS resets.
Table 4.1: Adapted Bonneau Framework [18]. Analysis of Security Questions [44], analysis of
web passwords [19]. Please note that the two extra security categories that we added were not











































































































































































































































































































































– offers the benefit, – almost offers the benefit, no circle – does not offer the benefit, –
potential to have the benefit , – potential to almost offer the benefit, – better than passwords,
– worse than passwords
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4.4 Resulting System and Policy Recommendations
Based on the findings from our user study we suggested several system and policy recommen-
dations for GeoSQ.
• As newer smartphones and more accurate localization comes along the error margin of 400
meters must be decreased.
This recommendation would greatly increase the sample space of the locations possible during
a guessing attack hence increasing the security of GeoSQ. Our error margin was devised based on
low end devices with lower than normal accuracy, as time passes by and localization improves we
expect that the error margin can be safely decreased without any negative effect on usability.
• As newer smartphones and more accurate localization comes along the unique location margin
of 200 meters can also be decreased.
The Google Maps API is undergoing constant updates that improves localization, this can be
observed by the fact that many different services that utilize the Google Maps API have become
more successful in pinpointing the exact establishment a user is in to a high degree of accuracy. Our
demographic (undergraduate university students) move around very little. Therefore, oftentimes
after the seven-day marker they did not have ten unique locations. Movements from building to
building on our university campus were often not registered due to the 200-meter margin set for
counting a unique location. Decreasing this margin for counting a unique location will greatly
improve usability and will make it more likely for users in the future to obtain 10 unique locations
in a shorter period of time. At the same time, the sample space will increase, hence improving the
security of GeoSQ.
• The optimal system setting occurs when the error margin and the margin for a unique
location is set to be equal.
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The margin for error currently set at 400 meters and the margin for a unique location which
is currently set to 200 meters is not the optimal configuration. Ideally, the margin for error
would be equal to the margin for a unique location. We were bottlenecked by the fact that older
devices had such a high error margin, following the same theme as previous recommendations that
more modern devices are capable of more accurate localization and very little cost to battery life.
Therefore, when those two system settings are set to be equal, the sample space greatly increases
at no foreseen cost to usability and an increase in the security of GeoSQ.
• Ensure that the timestamp labels the date and time (MM-DD) (HH:MM) as well as the day
of the week.
Throughout our user study, we observed that many participants had to look up the day of the
week for a certain date to try to remember where they were. They usually used their calendar
either on their smartphone or on their laptops. This increased the time it took for login and made
GeoSQ less usable. Therefore, we recommend adding the day of the week to the location question
for GeoSQ instead of simply have the date and the time as noted above.
4.5 Discussion and Future Work
Perfect authentication systems are ones that managed to bridge the security usability chasm
effectively. When designing and implementing GeoSQ, several decisions that affect usability, but
benefit security had to be made and vice versa as is the norm for any authentication system being
developed.
Similar work in the realm of autobiographical authentication made the same compromises.
For example, in the work done by Albayram et al. [13] they only utilized locations from the past
24 hours. Their goal was to improve memorability, but this affects security because it makes
monitoring the potential victim much easier, and the diversity of locations in only one day in a
real-world environment is very low.
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In GeoSQ we opted for more security by embedding a ten unique location requirement in
our authentication system which takes longer to collect and according to our results is much less
memorable than AlBayram et al’s. system [13]. AlBayram et al. observed a success rate of 69%
with their autobiographical location questions, while we only observed an average accuracy of
5.2/10 questions (roughly a 52% accuracy). Albayram et al. only asked one location question from
data gathered within the past 24 hours, while we asked 10 questions from data collected from the
past 7-11 days. It is important to note that our system was significantly different than AlBayram
et al’s. autobiographical authentication system [13] because a mixture of autobiographical data
was utilized in their system. That is why we only focus on the results of their autobiographical
location data.
The timespan to obtain ten unique locations in our demographic was typically 7-11 days as
observed in our study. This greatly affected the memorability as noted in our security and our
usability analysis of GeoSQ. Decreasing the timespan for collecting location and decreasing the
10 unique location requirement should lead us to observe an increase in memorability but a cor-
responding decrease in the sample space which would negatively affect our security. The first
question asked (which should have been from the previous 24 hours) was the least memorable
according to our user study we believe that it was an anomaly because AlBayram et al’s. work [13]
suggests that autobiographical location data from the past 24 hours is memorable 69% of the time.
In future work it would be interesting to alter GeoSQ so that the number of questions are
decreased with the timespan of data collected also being decreased. Based on the results of similar
work [13, 35], we should observe an increase in the memorability which would make the system
more usable.
Our results indicated that many participants would not prefer to utilize GeoSQ over other
authentication schemes (for fallback authentication or primary authentication). The average time it
took for participants to answer all 10 questions was 5 minutes and 40 seconds, which is considerably
more than it would take them to fallback authenticate using security questions, Email resets, and
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SMS resets. We also observed a great amount of audible frustration (“I don’t remember where
I was”) regarding the lack of memorability. Despite the security of GeoSQ it is highly unusable
because of high login time. It may be appropriate for fallback authentication but the frequency of
errors (due to lack of memorability) makes it highly unusable on a large scale.
Our threshold for counting a login attempt as successful was 7/10 correct questions answered.
By decreasing this threshold, we present a security challenge especially when it comes to the known
adversary (refer to Section 4.3.1, Figure 4.2 for the ROC graph). As a result, we do not recommend
that GeoSQ be utilized on a larger scale without further testing and tweaking the system settings
in order to increase the usability.
4.6 Conclusion
In conclusion we designed, implemented, and tested an autobiographical location authentication
system called GeoSQ. Our analysis leads us to the conclusion that GeoSQ is highly unusable given
the current system settings. While the observed security meets several requirements, the usability
in terms of two categories; login time (Efficient-to-Use) and accuracy (Infrequent-Errors) was
abysmal. The average login time was 5 minutes and 40 seconds, while the average accuracy
of the legitimate users was around 5.2/10 (52%). GeoSQ did not show much resistance to the
known adversary as 7% of the accounts would be guessed by the known adversary. Should we
decrease the threshold for a successful login from7/10 correct answers to 6/10 or 5/10 correct
answers for improved usability, then the known adversary would be a significant threat to the
system. Unfortunately, it appears that this system is unable to bridge the security-usability chasm.
While the target environment for GeoSQ was fallback authentication for smartphones, we do not




Today, the most commonly utilized fallback authentication mechanisms are security questions,
Email resets, and SMS resets, but unfortunately they have many security [18,31,34]. Despite that,
due to their usability, these fallback authentication mechanisms are still in use [18]. The flaws
in the current most popular fallback authentication mechanisms motivate our work to attempt to
find alternate replacement authentication mechanisms.
One such attempt at bridging the security-usability chasm is the utilization of geographic
authentication systems. Geographic authentication systems rely (at least) in part on a map, or
a location on a map, for authentication. Geographic authentication systems are distinct from
autobiographical location authentication systems (such as GeoSQ) that use a map as geographic
authentication systems do not rely on dynamic location data.
We attempt to bridge the security-usability chasm by designing, implementing and testing an
alternative authentication system called GeoPassHints. GeoPassHints is a geographic authentica-
tion system that can be used for fallback authentication or primary authentication. However, we
focus on GeoPassHints being deployed in a fallback authentication environment because of its use
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of a hint to hopefully help trigger long-term memory.
This chapter will be organized as follows; we will begin by introducing the system design.
Followed by that, we will complete our security, usability, and deployability analysis using data we
collected from our user study. Similar to GeoSQ, we will utilize the Bonneau et al. [18] framework,
which was developed for the comparative evaluation of web authentication systems. Lastly, we
will present our resulting system and policy recommendations, followed by a discussion and future
work section.
5.2 GeoPassHints System Design
GeoPassHints is a web-based authentication system that allows the user to set a location and
attach a secret note they associate with that location. The user is not required to remember the
location but is required to remember the secret note. Users have the option of searching to get
to a location or they can alternatively click, drag, or even touch on the screen if they have a
touchscreen laptop device. Users can also zoom in and zoom out as they please. GeoPassHints
was also developed with the Google Maps API [4]. Figure 5.1 shows the GeoPassHints interface.
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Figure 5.1: GeoPassHints interface.
5.2.1 GeoPassHints System Design and Development Details
The design of GeoPassHints had two challenges:
1. For improved security, we wanted to influence the participants to create longer secret notes
2. For security reasons, we wanted to make sure that the participants do not simply label the
location they have selected, as the hint would be useful to the attacker.
To address the latter challenge, as done by MacRae et al. [39] [48] we added the following
instructions during the secret note creation phase “Set your secret note by choosing a sequence of
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words that you can associate with this location. Avoid using the place’s name (e.g., ‘beach’ for
‘Daytona Beach’)”. To address the former challenge, we made sure that the input text area was
large enough to let the user know that this is meant to be a longer secret note. All of this can be
seen in Figure 5.1.
The solutions to the challenges seem to have worked. We had set a policy of at least five
characters for the secret note. According to the logs, only two participants ran into that error
when setting their GeoPassHints authentication credentials.
Much like GeoSQ the security goals we wanted to achieve were related to improving the overall
security and usability of fallback authentication systems.
As with GeoSQ, we also had to make some security concessions in order to ensure increased
usability. As mentioned earlier in Section 2.6, longer passphrases, user assigned passwords, and
system assigned passwords all tend to be unmemorable and annoying to use because of input error.
In order to account for that, we ensured that we had an error distance that was acceptable from a
security and usability point of view. We utilized the Levenshtein distance in order to achieve that.
The Levenshtein distance is a level of similarity between two strings [53]. We set the threshold to
be 80%; therefore, if a string was 80% similar to another string, we accepted that as correct input.
This could make it easier to guess, but it definitely makes it easier to input a longer secret note
because of the error margin allowed. We will analyze the usability and the security concerns in
Section 6.3.
After users set their location and associated secret note, they were prompted to confirm their
secret note. This is similar to how passwords are confirmed to ensure that there was no input
error. During the confirmation phase, we did not utilize the Levenshtein distance; the users had to
have an exact character match (including whitespace). The Levenshtein distance is only utilized
during subsequent authentication attempts, not when the users are setting their credentials.
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5.3 Results
In this section we will present our analysis of GeoPassHints. The analysis will be split into three
different broad categories 1-security, 2-usability, 3- deployability. Our analysis will be based on
the criteria laid out by the Bonneau et al. framework for the comparative evaluation of web-based
authentication schemes [18]. See Section 2.8 for a detailed description of each criteria.
Two criteria were added to the original Bonneau et al. framework, the first criteria added is
Resilient-to-Social-Media-Mining and the second criteria added is Resilient-to-the-Known-Adversary.
We added these two additional criteria for evaluation because of the increased risk of the known
adversary, and the increased risk posed by the information we post on our social media account
which is often open to mining.
A system is awarded being Resilient-to-Social-Media-Mining if social media mining cannot
provide an attacker with a leg up in guessing the user’s authentication information. We award an
authentication system this feature if social media mining does not improve the attacker’s ability to
guess by more than 1%. An authentication system is awarded the accolade of being Resilient-to-the-
Known-Adversary if any attacker with elevated access to a user’s devices and elevated knowledge of
the user cannot compromise the system. To be more specific, a throttled known adversary should
not be able to compromise more than 1% of accounts protected by the authentication system given
10 guesses a day for 365 days..
5.3.1 Security
Resilient-to-Physical-Observation
GeoPassHints is not considered to Resilient-to-Physical-Observation, While passwords are also
not Resilient-to-Physical-Observation [18], GeoPassHints is considered more resilient than pass-
words because of the longer average character length which stands at 17.3. However, GeoPassHints
is still not resilient to physical observation it is still conceivable that an attacker could impersonate
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a legitimate user after observing a user authenticate a few times.
Resilient-to-Targeted-Impersonation
GeoPassHints does not offer the benefit of being Resilient to Targeted Impersonation. We
examined 152 secret notes set and observed that many individuals set locations such as a previous
home or a current home and the associated secret note was descriptive, along the lines of “this is
my home”, “I live here”, “I used to live here”, “my future house”, “my home”. In addition, many
secret notes included references to where participants’ parents live. In our manual analysis of the
secret notes set, roughly 21% (32/152 ) of secret notes set were of that nature. Another common
trend we noticed was labelling where the participant works. In our manual analysis of the secret
notes set, roughly 4.6% (7/152 ) secret notes set were of that nature.
7.8% (3/38) participants reused notes for more than one account, and 10.5% (4/38) participants
labelled at least one of the locations despite instructions not to do so (i.e., the location set was
a restaurant called xyzrestaurant, and the secret note was “xyzrestaurant”). Lastly, there was a
common trend of setting locations and secret notes to schools and universities (i.e, set a university
location, and the secret note was “my university”, or “I go to school here”); roughly 7.2% (11/152)
secret notes had some variation of that trend. Overall, 3.2% (5/152) secret notes were direct labels,
32.9% (50/152) were personal descriptive labels (e.g., involving home, work, or school), and 5.9%
(9/152) were reused. An in depth analysis will be conducted in Section 5.4.
We evaluate whether or not the common trends in labelling and setting commonly known
locations such as home or work made it easier for the known adversary to guess in Section 6.3.1 -
Resilient-to-the Known Adversary.
Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing
According to Bonneau et al. [18], a system is awarded being Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing if
an attacker, while being constrained by a verifier, cannot compromise more than 1% of accounts
CHAPTER 5. GEOPASSHINTS 86
a year given ten guesses a day.
We utilized three different methods for password cracking. The first method we utilized was
a probabilistic context-free grammar [54]. A probabilistic context free grammar is considered to
be a more sophisticated attack against passwords that generates password guesses in descending
probability order. A probabilistic context-free grammar will generate password guesses in descend-
ing order based on a training set. The training set will first be parsed into base structures for
example “ILoveKarina123.” would be LLLLLLLLLLLDDDS where L is alphabetic based string,
D is a digit string, and S is a special character string. Once a training set (or several training sets)
are input and parsed using the probabilistic context-free grammar, then a list of password guesses
in descending probability of occurrence is generated based on the most probable base structures
and terminals. In our work, we train using the RockYou dataset [6], a leaked dataset of 32 million
passwords that is publicly available for analysis.
Figure 5.2 showcases the number of secret notes guessed for each account type utilizing Weir’s
probabilistic context-free grammar [54]. Approximately 2.2% (3/136) of banking account secret
notes, and e-commerce account secret notes were guessed after 230 guesses. This means that secret
notes are Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing. Because 3650 guessing is 211.85 according to Figure 5.2
only 0% of secret notes were guessed utilizing the PCFG at 211.85 guesses. No social media secret
notes were guessed using the PCFG.
The second method we utilized for password cracking is the semantic cracker [51]. The semantic
cracker segments a set of training passwords into their core components (alphabetic, numeric,
special symbol, and then further characterizes the alphabetic components using part-of-speech
and then Wordnet [8] which is a database for English language vocabulary, to determine their
semantic categories). The core components are used in a PCFG to generate guesses from highest
to lowest probability. We used the RockYou [6] dataset for training. Figure 5.3 showcases the
results of the semantic cracker, which was the most successful at guessing secret notes. Banking
account secret notes were the most successfully guessed (5.1% or 7/136) ). Again, based on the
CHAPTER 5. GEOPASSHINTS 87
results obtained by the semantic cracker, GeoPassHints is Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing. Due to
the fact that no secret notes were guessed by the semantic cracker at 211.85 guesses.
The third and last method we utilized for password cracking was John the Ripper [3]. John
the Ripper is a popular password cracking tool that has many different modes. We utilized the
incremental mode. The incremental mode within John the Ripper utilizes frequency tables in order
to crack passwords. Frequency tables rely on letters that occur most in the English dictionary. For
example, the letter e is highly likely to come after the letter h. JtR incremental will utilize trigram
frequencies for each character position within a password. Trigrams are sequences of three letters,
meaning that John the Ripper in incremental mode will utilize frequency tables for sequences of
three letters to determine which letter is most likely to occur next. This is a slow cracking method
that has the capability of guessing passwords that are not in the English dictionary.
Figure 5.4 showcases the password guessing results utilizing John the Ripper in incremental
mode. John the Ripper was most successful in guessing e-commerce account secret notes and bank
account secret notes( 1.4% or 2/136). Based on the definition of Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing
GeoPassHints is also Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing when utilizing John the Ripper in incremental
mode.
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Figure 5.2: Percentage of secret notes guessed utilizing Weir’s Probabilistic Context Free Grammar
(PCFG) [54].
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Figure 5.3: Percentage of secret notes guessed using a semantic cracker.
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Figure 5.4: Percentage of secret notes guessing utilizing John the Ripper in incremental mode.
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Resilient-to-Unthrottled-Guessing
GeoPassHints does not provide the feature of being Resilient-to-Unthrottled-Guessing. The
17.3 average character length of a secret note provides additional security than a typical password
because it is much larger than the space of a typical password as evaluated by Bonneau et al. [18].
Therefore, at minimum GeoPassHints offers more resilience than the typical password despite the
fact that our minimum character policy was set to 5. However, more than 1% of secret notes were
guessed by our guessing algorithms in only 1 billion guesses (Weir’s PCFG [54], John the Ripper
(incremental mode) [3], and a semantic cracker [51]) as shown in Figures 5.2,5.3, and 5.4.
Resilient-to-Internal-Observation
According to Bonneau et al. [18], an authentication mechanism is Resilient-to-Internal-Observation
if the attacker cannot impersonate the legitimate user by intercepting the legitimate user’s input.
An example of internal observation would be key logging or recording the screen of the legitimate
user and relaying to an attacker’s computer.
GeoPassHints is not Resilient-to-Internal-Observation. That is due to the fact that GeoPassH-
ints relies on previously set credentials. Therefore, on an infected computer, GeoPassHints is not
effective because the secret note can be compromised.
Resilient-to-Leaks-from-other-Verifiers
A system is classified as Resilient-to-Leaks-from-other-Verifiers ; if anything, another verifier
leak could potentially help an attacker impersonate a legitimate user [18].
GeoPassHints does not offer any protection when it comes to leaks from other verifiers. If the
user decides to reuse a GeoPassHints secret note paired with the same location, then it would be
easy for an attacker to impersonate a legitimate user. This would mimic the reuse of passwords that
is typical of the majority of users [33]. Our user study showed 7.9% (3/38) of participants reused
some note/location combinations, despite instructions to choose unique locations and unique secret
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notes.
Resilient-to-Phishing
GeoPassHints is considered Resilient to Phishing, against classical phishing attacks, because
the location is set by the user. Therefore, one piece of information is being provided by the verifier,
which the user can detect as being incorrect. A successful classical phishing attack can only be
conducted if there is a leak from a verifier. Of course, it is not resilient to more advanced phishing
attacks, such as targeted attacks, or man-in-the-middle attacks.
Resilient-to-Theft
This category is pertinent for authentication mechanisms that rely on a physical object for
authentication. Resilient-to-Theft is not a pertinent issue for GeoPassHints, because there is no
physical object to steal.
No-Trusted-Third-Party
This feature is awarded to systems that only rely on the user and verifier [18]. GeoPassHints
does not require a trusted third party. In our implementation we utilized the Google Maps API
for convenience; however, there are open source Map APIs that can be utilized [5]. These open
source map APIs are not considered a third party as they would run locally, hence GeoPassHints
does not rely on a trusted third party.
Requiring-Explicit-Consent
This feature is awarded to systems that require the user to initiate an authentication. It is
regarded as a security and privacy feature [18]. GeoPassHints requires explicit consent for an
authentication process to begin, so it is also awarded this feature.
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Unlinkable
An authentication system is classified as Unlinkable if a set of colluding systems cannot deter-
mine from the authenticator whether or not it is belongs to the same user on multiple different
platforms [18].
Except for a user that utilizes the same GeoPassHints secret note across multiple different
verifiers, colluding verifiers cannot determine whether the same user is authenticating to different
platforms. Therefore, unlike GeoSQ, GeoPassHints is classified as Unlinkable.
Resilient-to-Social-Media-Mining
This category is an addition to the original framework proposed by Bonneau et al. [18]. A
system is awarded this feature if social media mining cannot provide an attacker with a leg up in
guessing the user’s authentication information. We award an authentication system this feature if
social media mining does not improve the attacker’s ability to guess by more than 1%.
GeoPassHints is Resilient-to-Social-Media-Mining. While location posts could uncover that a
potential victim lives at a certain address, which could give the attacker a leg up in terms of a
targeted guessing attack with that information, the large sample space (average character length
was 17.3) even with an error margin of 20% (Levenshtein distance) we suggest that it would not
be a significant advantage. In addition to that, we offer that GeoPassHints is Resilient-to-Social-
Media-Mining because the all the participants indicated that they follow each other on social
media, on an average of 2.67 different social media mediums (platforms), with an average of 3.05
social media per week, of which only 1.62 were location posts. Despite the fact that all participants
followed each other on social media, only 2.9% (4/136) secret notes were guessed with a Levenshtein
distance of 80%.
As mentioned earlier, there was a significant amount of descriptive labelling of previous, current,
and future addresses, in addition to labelling universities and places where the participants work.
A total of 32.9% (50/152) of secret notes followed that trend, not to mention direct labelling of
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locations, a total of 3.2%(5/152) of notes followed that trend. None of them were successfully
guessed by known adversaries, despite the fact that they follow each other on social media hence
GeoPassHints is Resilient-to-Social-Media-Mining.
Resilient-to-the-Known-Adversary
Resilient-to-the-Known-Adversary is another category that we appended to the originally pro-
posed Bonneau et al. framework [18]. An authentication system is awarded the accolade of being
resilient to the known adversary if any attacker with elevated access to a user’s devices and el-
evated knowledge of the user cannot compromise the system. To be more specific, a throttled
known adversary should not be able to compromise more than 1% of accounts protected by the
authentication system given 10 guesses a day for 365 days.
Based on those parameters, GeoPassHints is not Resilient-to-the-Known-Adversary. While
conducting a manual analysis on the secret notes created by our participants, certain trends were
clear. A great number of people would set the location to their home and associate a secret note
that eludes to that fact such as “this is my home” or “this is where I live”. We also noticed a
significant labelling of geographic locations and businesses.
We also found that the account type did have an effect on the secret note/locations that the
participants set. For example, for the hypothetical bank account we found that many individuals
selected their bank or associated a secret note with that hypothetical account with something to
with “money” or “my bank”. The logo we used in order to cue the participants that this was a
bank account was a logo for the Bank of Montreal, a popular bank with a well-known logo, one
user simply labelled the closest BMO branch with “bmo bank”.
In addition to that, we found that four participants reused secret notes across the hypothetical
accounts. It is clear that this trend is following the user’s tendencies to pick the same password
across multiple different accounts [40]. All of these factors would seem to indicate that GeoPassH-
ints is not resilient to the known adversary.
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Contrary to these initial patterns found in the manual analysis, GeoPassHints appeared to be
strong in its resilience to the known adversary and the secret notes and the patterns mentioned
above were not the secret notes that were guessed successfully the pairs. Despite that, a total of
4 notes were guessed by four participants, out of a total of 136 notes set (2.9%), which is higher
than the threshold set out by this category. Please note that this number is not out of 152 as
indicated in the note patterns mentioned in previous sections because only 17 pairs came back for
Session 2. To the best of our ability, we ensured that the participants did not communicate when
they were attempting to guess each other’s secret notes to preserve the integrity of the data and
to mimic a real-life scenario with a known adversary attempting to access an account or device
without authorization; however, we were not able to prevent communication between sessions.
GeoPassHints is a system where the settings and thresholds matter to a great extent. In our
case we were using a Levenshtein distance metric to give the participants and error margin (since
the idea was to have longer secret notes and reduce the annoyance caused by typos affecting large
strings for passwords). The question then becomes what is the ideal error margin? In order to
answer that question, we created a ROC graph which is featured in Figure 5.5.
As shown in the ROC graph (Figure 5.5), it is clear that a threshold of 1 (an exact character
match) is not usable; roughly 15 percent of the participants managed to remember a secret note
correctly with this threshold after a period of 7-11 days. Our target threshold for success in our
study was a Levenshtein distance of 0.8 which is a 20% error margin between the target string
(secret note set during Session 1) and the input string (secret note recall during Session 2).
However, after conducting this analysis, we see that the false positive rate does not improve
when the threshold is decreased to 0.7 (30% different than the target string), while at the same time
the true positive rate does increase significantly when the threshold is set lower. The same trend
follows when we decrease the threshold to 0.6. Only 2.9% (4/136) of accounts were compromised
with a threshold of 0.8, 0.7, and 0.6. This data suggests that GeoPassHints is not Resilient-to-the-
Known-Adversary, and it also indicates that the correct usability/security tradeoff in terms of the
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Figure 5.5: ROC graph showing the effect the threshold will have on the false positive rate and
the true positive rate.
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threshold is anywhere between 0.6-0.8, with the system becoming highly unusable with thresholds
that are above that limit.
In our study, the pairs only had 5 mandatory guesses for each account, we did not make it
10 mandatory guesses to match this framework criteria due to time constraints. However, the
Levenshtein Distance for the five guess attempts for each account were often too far below the
threshold for that to matter. The Levenshtein distance average of all guesses was around 0.02.
5.3.2 Usability
Memorywise-Effortless
In order for an authentication system to be considered Memorywise-Effortless it must not
require a user to remember any secret at all [18]. A system is rewarded with the status of being
Quasi-Memorywise-Effortless if there is only one secret to remember for all verifiers [18].
Based on the parameters laid out above, GeoPassHints is also not Memorywise-Effortless.
Technically, the users could have one location and one secret note across all verifiers; however,
that is not recommended for the same reason it is not recommended for passwords due to the
avalanche effect, which in this scenario means a single leak or compromise causing the multiple
accounts and devices to be compromised.
Scalable- for-Users
An authentication system is considered Scalable for Users if using the authentication system
for many accounts does not put any extra burden on the user [18]. For example, if a user is asked
to set multiple passwords across different verifiers, then as the number of accounts increase, the
burden on the user is increasing.
GeoPassHints is not Scalable for Users because as the number of accounts increase, the user
has to spend time registering authentication credentials. In addition, with the assumption that
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the users will (hopefully) utilize different locations and different secret notes for each account, the
memory burden increases on the user
Nothing-to-Carry
This category is awarded to authentication systems that do not require the user to carry
anything to be able to authenticate. Some systems require a physical card to be present for
authentication, these systems would not be granted the Nothing to Carry accolade [18]. Since
GeoPassHints only requires the memorability of the secret note and does not require any physical
object, it would be considered a system with Nothing to Carry.
Physically-Effortless
This category is granted to authentication systems that do not require the user to perform any
action past the pressing of a button (to indicate authentication is occurring i.e., submit) [18].
GeoPassHints requires the user to register the authentication credentials and requires the user
to type and click submit in order to complete an authentication sequence correctly. Hence it is
not Physically Effortless.
Easy-to-Learn
In order to determine whether or not GeoPassHints is easy to learn how to use, and easy to use,
we followed up the usage of GeoPassHints with two usability questions: 1-I thought the system
[GeoPassHints] was easy to use, 2- I thought the system [GeoPassHints] was easy to learn how to
use. The users were asked to indicate the extent in which they agreed with those statements on a
scale of 1 to 7. Figure 5.6 showcases the results.
76% of our participants agreed, strongly agreed, or very strongly agreed that GeoPassHints
was easy to use. 11% of our participants were neutral and only 13% either disagreed or strongly
disagreed with the statement. As for the second question regarding ease of learning, GeoPassHints
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did even better with 87% of participants agreeing, strongly agreeing, or very strongly agreeing
that GeoPassHints was easy to learn how to use. 11% of our participants were neutral and 3%
disagreed. Based on those results we grant GeoPassHints the accolade of being easy to learn how
to use and Easy to Learn.
Figure 5.6: GeoPassHints usability Likert Scale questions.
Efficient-to-Use
In order to an authentication system to be considered Efficient to Use the time spent for
each authentication must be acceptably short [18], the time required for a user to set up his/her
credentials with a verifier should also be reasonable [18]. Bonneau et al. do not specify empirical
values for this category which is appropriate because of the variety of authentication systems and
the variety of intended use. For example, a smartphone would be more secure with an 8-character
password; however, it is unusable for that target environment because a user typically wants to
access the smartphone quickly.
GeoPassHints requires the user to register the location and secret note. Figure 5.7 shows
the registration time for each account, in order of registration, in the user study. One thing
automatically pops out; unlike the expected gradual decrease in registration time as people became
more familiar with the interface, GeoPassHints actually had a gradual increase in the registration
time for each account.
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Figure 5.7: Boxplot for setting and confirming account credentials.
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The average credential set time (set + confirm) across all four accounts (n=38) was 2.39
minutes. That is considered inefficient when compared to equivalent geographical authentication
schemes such as GeoPassNotes which had a reported 31 second set time on average [39] [48], and
a 24 second confirm time on average (total = 55 seconds).
As for the average login time, GeoPassHints does not perform very well since the average
number of attempts until a successful login was 3.26 (std= ± 0.52). Figure 5.8 showcases the
average login time for successful attempts and Figure 5.9 showcases the average login time for all
the attempts until successful authentication was achieved.
Figure 5.8: Successful login attempt time.
As shown in Figure 5.8 and 5.9, on average there were significant delays in successful logins
as a result of failed attempts. The average login time on a successful attempt for email accounts,
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Figure 5.9: Login time including failures
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bank accounts, e-commerce accounts, and social media accounts were 42.6s, 37.9s, 48s, and 49.6s
respectively. If the unsuccessful attempts are included, then the times shoot up to 100s, 96.9s, 88.5s,
and 111s respectively. To compare it to a similar geographic authentication system GeoPassNotes
[39] contained far fewer failures only 4 participants in Session 2 of the study conducted by MacRae
et al. (n=35) failed to login on their first attempt, all participants in that study eventually managed
to login. The average login time in Session 2 of that study which was 7-8 days after Session 1 was
around 30s which is much lower than GeoPassHints. We conduct further analysis on this matter in
the Infrequent-Errors Section. Because of the high login times GeoPassHints will not be classified
as Efficient to Use.
Infrequent-Errors
An authentication system may be awarded in the Infrequent Errors category if the login task
typically succeeds when performed by the true user [18].
GeoPassHints is also prone to user input error despite having an error margin of 20% utilizing
Levenshtein’s Distance. Participants had an average of 3.26 (std= ±0.52) failed attempts until
a successful login. Only 9% (3/34) of participants managed to remember all four hypothetical
account secret notes, one of which utilized the same secret note for each account. Figure 5.10
showcases the correct/incorrect responses for all participants for each account type, and Figure
5.11 showcases the average for each participant for every account type. A detailed secret note
analysis in Section 5.4 will go into detail regarding an in-depth analysis by categorizing each
failure (or successful) attempt.
At this error threshold (0.8 Levenshtein’s Distance), we expected that more participants would
be able to login successfully and without that many errors. The long character length that the
participants set tended to make the secret note harder to remember, even with the error margin
allotted. However, we did observe that the true positive rate increased as the threshold was
decreased, which means the participants were at times close. Figure 5.5 showcases how the true
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Figure 5.10: Comparison of correct and incorrect responses for all users across all four different
account types (n=34).
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Figure 5.11: Boxplot of the total correct responses per participant for all four accounts. Partici-
pants received five attempts before having to reset that account.
positive rate increases steeply to 0.39 when the error margin is set to 0.6 instead of 0.8, without
increasing the false positive rate. This is a promising feature that could be investigated further;
however, any improvements to the system need to go beyond this one thing as a true positive rate
of 0.39 is too low.
Overall, due to the fact that at a threshold of 0.8 this authentication system was not sufficient
in increasing the true positive rate to usable levels we do not award GeoPassHints as having
Infrequent Errors.
Easy-Recovery-from-Loss
This category rewards authentication systems that make it easy to recover from loss. it is
very easy to recover from loss in the GeoPassHints authentication system. In our study, users
could simply reset the location and the associated secret note. In terms of reset time, the reset
+ reset confirmation time was much shorter (average = 1m:15s std = ±20s) than the time it
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took participants to set and confirm their credentials in the first place (refer to Figure 5.7). This
is probably due to the fact that at this stage, they no longer had to ask questions and they
remembered how to use the system from Session 1.
As a result of the ease of reset, the recovery from loss in all scenarios should not be time
consuming, hence GeoPassHints is considered to be easy to recover from loss.
5.3.3 Participant Preferences, Attitudes, and Concerns
This section will encompass other usability dimensions for GeoPassHints that are not part for
the Bonneau et al. Framework [18]. At the end of Session 2, we asked participants to fill out an
exit survey for GeoPassHints; which asked usability, preference, and concern questions in order to
determine how the participants viewed the GeoPassHints system. All of the questions were Likert
Scale questions ranging from 1 to 7.
We began by asking participants if GeoPassHints was easy to use, and if GeoPassHints was
easy to learn how to use. The results are showcased in Figure 5.6, most participants indicated that
GeoPassHints was easy to use and easy to learn how to use. After asking the participants whether
or not the system was easy to use and easy to learn how to use, we asked the participants whether
or not they wrote anything down to assist them in recalling the secret note. Only one participant
indicated keeping a record of one secret note.
Followed by that we asked: For a mobile device’s forgotten password/PIN or failed biometric,
to what extent would you prefer to use this system [GeoPassHints] in lieu of any of the following
fallback authentication methods? The fallback authentication methods were security questions,
Email resets, and SMS resets. Figure 5.12 showcases the results.
CHAPTER 5. GEOPASSHINTS 107
Figure 5.12: For a mobile device’s forgotten password/PIN or failed biometric, to what extent
would you prefer to use this system (GeoPassHints) in lieu of any of the following fallback authen-
tication methods?
GeoPassHints seems to be appealing to the participants, the majority of the participants ap-
peared to favor GeoPassHints in lieu of Security Questions, Email Resets, and SMS Resets, when
it comes to fallback authentication for mobile devices, as shown in Figure 5.12.
After asking whether or not participants would prefer to utilize GeoPassHints in lieu of the
commonly utilized fallback authentication methods we asked: For an online account’s forgotten
password, to what extent would you prefer to use this system in lieu of any of the following fallback
authentication methods? Figure 5.13 showcases the results.
Figure 5.13: For an online account’s forgotten password, to what extent would you prefer to use
this system in lieu of any of the following fallback authentication methods?
The participants also appeared to respond positively to utilizing GeoPassHints instead of com-
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mon fallback authentication mechanisms for the recovery of online accounts as shown in Figure
5.13.
Next, we move on to the preferences, we asked the participants whether not they prefer to
utilize GeoPassHints over a password for a series of different account types as shown in Figure
5.14.
Figure 5.14: I would prefer to use the GeoPassHints system to login to any of the following
accounts, instead of entering a password, for these account types.
Figure 5.14 paints a diverse range of opinions regarding the utilization of GeoPassHints for
different account types. We observe a great amount of neutral responses for the GeoPassHints. We
suspect it is because GeoPassHints was greatly similar to entering a password. Overall, participants
are more likely to prefer to utilize GeoPassHints over entering a password or be neutral regarding
the issue.
Furthermore, we asked the participants two questions about their concerns regarding GeoPassH-
ints. 1- If you use this system, how likely do you think it is that someone you know could access
your device/accounts without consent? 2- How concerned are you about a privacy leak on any
medium? Please note that for GeoPassHints we did not ask the participants about their concerns
over a location service application leaking their information because it is not pertinent. The results
are displayed in Figure 5.15.
Overall, participants were not concerned that utilizing GeoPassHints would in anyway lead to
CHAPTER 5. GEOPASSHINTS 109
Figure 5.15: Participant security/privacy concerns regarding GeoPassHints. 1- If you use this
system, how likely do you think it is that someone you know could access your device/accounts
without consent? 2- How concerned are you about a privacy leak on any medium?
the known adversary being able to access their accounts/devices without consent. Only 32% of
participants indicated any concern that GeoPassHints would could lead to the known adversary
being able to access their accounts/devices. Participants did not seem too concerned regarding a
privacy leak on any medium with only 32% of participants indicating that they were concerned
about a privacy leak on any medium.
Lastly, we asked the participants to give us some feedback regarding the system, only two people
gave negative regarding the responsiveness of the system (they felt like it was too slow in some
instances), there are a variety of factors for that including the connection speed, implementation
errors that lead to four participants not being able to load the location properly (the map was not




We did some research regarding the accessibility tools provided by the Google Maps API
specifically tailored towards browsers. We found that Google does provide accessibility features
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such as screen reader compatibility on browsers, the ability to explore a Google Map using a
keyboard (for individuals with problems relating to motor control who cannot utilize a mouse),
and keyboard shortcuts that can aid individuals with problems relating to motor control. These
accessibility features are available on desktop/laptop browsers [1]. Hence, we award GeoPassHints
in the Accessibility category.
Negligible-Cost-per-User
GeoPassHints is awarded in the Negligible-Cost-per-User category because implementing the
system is possible with open and free to use APIs hence the burden on a verifier implementing
such a system does not go up when the system is scaled to many users.
Server-Compatible
In order for a system to be awarded the accolade of being server compatible, verifiers must not
have to significantly change their existing authentication settings, and the authentication system
must be compatible with text-based passwords from the point of view of the verifier. GeoPassHints
would require significant edits made to the backend to make both this authentication system work.
Browser-Compatible
The Google Maps API is what we used to develop the geographic portion of GeoPassHints.
That API which renders a map and provides us with several different functions including setting a
marker on a map is compatible with most modern browsers. Versions of popular browser vendors
up to three years of age such as Safari, Google Chrome, and Firefox support every feature we
have implemented according to our testing on BroswerStack and personal browsers. Therefore,
GeoPassHints is Browser-Compatible.
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Mature
GeoPassHints is not a mature authentication system, this category is gauged towards authen-
tication systems that have already been implemented widely. GeoPassHints is simply an authen-
tication system we designed and implemented for testing purposes that has not been tested for a
long period of time on a wide scale.
Nonproprietary
GeoPassHints is not patented in anyway and the technology behind it (Google Maps API) is free
and open to use with alternatives to this API being readily available (though not as good). Table
6.1 shows the full system evaluation according to the Bonneau et al. framework [18] in addition
to our two added categories, and compares GeoPassHints to passwords, security questions, Email
resets, and SMS resets.
5.4 Secret Note Recall Analysis
In order to further understand the usability issues generally, and more specifically the memo-
rability issues, we conducted a semantic analysis on all the secret notes set and input during login
by our participants. We eliminated some notes and recall attempts based on some criteria such as
technical issues while attempting to remember the note, repetitiveness, or failure to adhere to the
instructions. Participants could fail to adhere to instructions for a variety of reasons, for example.
we provided instructions regarding labelling in the oral instructions portion of the study specifi-
cally in Session 1 where we said direct labelling is barred (e.g., setting Adam Scott High School as
the location and labelling it as such), another common failure to adhere to instructions would be
setting the same note for all four hypothetical accounts. Repetitiveness was not expressly barred
during the instructions, however, any participant that utilized the same location/secret note com-
bination for all four of their hypothetical accounts were excluded. Lastly, technical difficulties that
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Table 5.1: Adapted Bonneau et al. framework [18]. Analysis of Security Questions [44], analysis
of web passwords [19]. Please note that the two extra categories that we added were not evaluated











































































































































































































































































































































– offers the benefit, – almost offers the benefit, no circle – does not offer the benefit, –
potential to have the benefit , – potential to almost offer the benefit, – better than passwords,
– worse than passwords
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we excluded from the analysis were ones relating to not seeing the location. This is an implemen-
tation issue that was subsequently fixed. In the end we had 124 valid secret notes out of a total
of 136 secret notes from a total of 16 pairs, only 17 pairs returned for Session 2 of our study. One
participant was disqualified due to repetitiveness and direct labelling. Four hypothetical accounts
(spread out across different participants were also excluded due to technical errors.
First we begin by analyzing and classifying the type of secret notes that the participants set.
Before we delve into the breakdown it is important to explain the categories we sorted the secret
notes set into and explain how we came up with them.
During the manual observation analysis of the notes set, we noticed that a great deal of them
were labels of some sort (e.g., this is my home, a place where I attended a lot of concerts etc..).
This lead to us noticing a large scale pattern that a great percentage of the notes revolved around
labelling a place descriptively, directly, or at a higher level. Therefore we sorted the notes set by
our participants into four categories.
The first category is a general direct label of some sort (e.g., this is my home). The second
category is a descriptive label (e.g., first house in Canada). The third category is a direct naming.
Lastly, the fourth category is a more general category encompassing secret notes set that did not
fall within the general labelling trend, the fourth category is not a label or other. The results are
displayed in Table 5.2 below showcases the results.
Category Number of Notes




Table 5.2: Breakdown of secret notes into categories.
Since we consider naming to be labelling 83 (67%) of the 124 secret notes set by our participants
was some kind of labelling. However, the failure rates were very high as noted previously. As a
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result, we conducted a further analysis on each recall attempt in order to ascertain what might be
the real issue. We would like to find out whether or not the labelling was an effective strategy to
help the user remember the secret note.
In order to categorize the failures we created four general categories. The first category was
memory loss, the second category was semantic similarity, and the third category was rewording,
the last category was interference. Semantic similarity is a category that we created in order to
categorize recall attempts that were similar in meaning to the set secret note but incorrect because
it was not an 80% match to the set secret note (e.g., the set note being “this is my home” while
the recall attempt was something relating to the home). Memory loss is a category for failed recall
attempts that were not close to the original set note. Rewording is a category that encompasses
recall attempts that were similar to the originally set secret note but were reworded in some way
that led to a failure (e.g., “I saw the raptors play here” as the set secret note and the recall
attempt being “This is where I saw the raptors play”). Lastly, we include a category for the
interference effect which occurs as a result of not knowing which secret note belongs to an account,
since they set four locations and associated secret notes (e.g., a user sets “This is my home” is a
the secret note for their hypothetical bank account but instead of using that secret note for their
hypothetical bank account they utilize that secret note for their hypothetical email account). This
analysis includes all failed attempts until success or all failed attempts until 5 failure attempts at
which point the participants were asked to reset the note. Table 5.3 showcases the results of our
analysis.
Category Number of Notes
Semantic Similarity 74 (26.8%)
Memory Loss 100 (36.2%)
Interference 21 (7.6%)
Rewording 81 (29.3%)
Table 5.3: Categorization of failed attempts.
The semantic similarity issues appeared to occur as a result of the participant remembering
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that this note was set as a result of a location they were associating with a memory. However,
they could not remember exactly how they wrote the secret note in Session 1, as a result many
attempts with a semantic similarity ended in failure as shown in the failure rates. Memory loss
was the primary source of failed attempts. Please note that some of these failed attempts ended
in success eventually. Labelling did present itself as a viable method of increasing memorability.
Combined, the different types of labelling compose 66.9% of the total set secret notes (83/124).
The participants that labelled did have a higher success rate than those who did not. Of those 83
notes we categorized as some sort of label, the eventual success rate (despite some failures in the
beginning) is 74.6% (62/83). This compares well to the success rate of the secret notes that were
not categorized as labels which had a 48.7% (20/41) success rate.
5.5 Resulting System and Policy Recommendations
Based on the findings from our user study we suggested several system and policy recommen-
dations for GeoPassHints.
• Blacklisting certain keywords is necessary, to prevent the secret note from being descriptive.
During our analysis of the secret notes set by the participants, several trends were noticed such
as some variation of “I live here” or “where I work”. This is very dangerous because a known
adversary with the right motivation is more likely to know current and previous work and home
addresses. That in turn makes it easier for a known adversary to guess the secret note should this
trend continue. Which leads to the necessity of blacklisting certain common secret notes that tend
to be highly descriptive.
Another type of blacklisting that is necessary is to avoid directly labelling an institution/busi-
ness that has been set as a location. That can easily be done by utilizing Google Places to get a
list of businesses/institutions within a certain range of the location set. Verbatim labelling of a lo-
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cation within the secret note is very dangerous because it makes the secret notes highly vulnerable
to a guessing attack that involves a list of places.
Blacklisting should improve how GeoPassHints fares in the Resilient-to-Unthrottled-Guessing
criteria. In future work, it would be interesting to implement these blacklists and perform the
secret note guessing analysis on notes created under both those criteria.
• Lowering the Levenshtein distance threshold for a successful login is important for usability.
Currently the threshold for a successful login utilizing GeoPassHints is a 0.8 string similarity
utilizing the Levenshtein distance. Based on the ROC graph (Figure 5.5) the true positive rate
increases significantly with a Levenshtein distance of 0.7 or even a Levenshtein distance of 0.6
without affecting the false positive rate. That means even if the Levenshtein distance threshold
for a successful login was lowered all the way to 0.6, we did not observe a security implication,
while the usability greatly increased.
• Setting the secret note, and confirming the secret note can occur on the same page.
In our system design of GeoPassHints the participant had to set the location and the secret
note. After they clicked submit, the secret note had to be confirmed. However, in lieu of that
configuration, we propose that the secret note set, and secret note confirmation occur on the
same page much like how passwords are set and confirmed on the same page. We make this
recommendation in an effort to decrease the time required to set GeoPassHints credentials which
would in turn make it more usable.
• Set a policy for whitespace and punctuation.
During our analysis of the results, we noticed that some participants were confused whether
they should include whitespace and punctuation because they usually do not do so with passwords.
Secret notes are incredibly similar to passwords which causes that confusion. Therefore, it would
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be helpful to include a note while the users are setting their credentials that whitespaces and
punctuation are okay.
• Encourage Association
As mentioned earlier labelling of any kind does improve the chance that a secret note will
be successfully remembered 7-11 days after it was set. While direct labelling and direct naming
should be discouraged for fear of a security compromise, it is important to associate the secret
note and the selected location with a memory of some sort. Many labels analyzed were a type of
association, and that yielded a higher success rate. Therefore, changing the instructions to include
an emphasis on association with some sort of memory could enhance the memorability of the secret
note to a great extent.
5.6 Discussion and Future Work
A perfect authentication system is one that balances security and usability. In order for an
authentication system to bridge the security-usability chasm, it must offer quick credential setting
and quick authentication paired with durable security to a whole variety of threats.
Unfortunately, GeoPassHints does not bridge the security-usability chasm. The login time,
which stands at an average of 100 seconds (refer to Figure 5.8), appears to be too lengthy especially
when counting in the number of failures until a successful login.
Given the lengthy login time, GeoPassHints would not be well placed in a primary authenti-
cation setting. However, as a fallback authentication system GeoPassHints would be comparable
with security questions, Email resets, and SMS resets [17]. Fallback authentication occurs much
less often than primary authentication [17, 34]. Therefore, it is more acceptable for an authenti-
cation system to take longer to authenticate if it provides a security improvement. In the case
of GeoPassHints which provides many advantages over security questions, Email resets, and SMS
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resets, the login time which stands at an average of roughly 100 seconds including all the failed
attempts is deemed acceptable.
Where GeoPassHints lacks is its success rate. Figure 5.5 showcases the ROC graph on how
altering the Levenshtein distance threshold for a successful login will affect the true positive rate
and the false positive rate. Even with the Levenshtein distance threshold set to be 0.6 (60% string
similarity), the true positive rate is still very low standing at roughly 39%. That means even with
that low threshold, 61% of participants would fail to login using GeoPassHints 7-11 days after
setting that credential.
It is important to note that fallback authentication typically occurs over a much longer times-
pan after setting the fallback authentication credentials. The typical average time from fallback
authentication credential setting to utilization is around 6 months [17]. Session 3 of our user study
has not been conducted yet but based on the abysmal results from Session 2 of our user study in
terms of GeoPassHints secret note memorability, we can assume that this 39% true positive rate
even at a Levenshtein distance of 60% will drop. Hence, making GeoPassHints highly unmemorable
for as a fallback authentication system.
To compare, security questions require you to remember a piece of information, much like
GeoPassHints requires you to remember the secret note. Security questions succeed roughly 60%
of the time [17] after a six-month interval, and even that is considered a low score for memorability.
According to our analysis of GeoPassHints secret notes and their resilience to throttled guessing,
we found that the secret notes showed a great amount of resilience to all three password guessing
methods that we utilized (Weir’s probabilistic context-free grammar [54], a semantic cracker [51],
John the Ripper (incremental mode) [3]). When compared to the resilience of passwords attained
from popular password leaks, the secret notes set by the participants appear to offer much more
resistance to password guessing attacks. This is an important security feature, but due to the high
failure rate this system still cannot be recommended as a fallback authentication system.
We also observed an interesting anomaly when analyzing the data obtained from the user study.
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Credential setting time tended to increase as the participants were going through different accounts.
Figure 5.7 showcases how the credential set time tended to increase. We designed the user study
so that the participants would have to set credentials for four different accounts to test for multiple
password interference [11, 22]. During our physical observation throughout Session 1, we noticed
that participants did take their time deciding which location to select; as they progressed through
the accounts they had to set credentials for, they were running out of places to set their location
markers.
As part of our multiple password interference analysis, we observed that only 8.8% (3/34)
participants input a secret note for one account that was meant for another account (e.g., they
input their hypothetical Email account secret note in their hypothetical banking account secret
note). All three of those participants input the secret note incorrectly for all 5 attempts. One
participant who made that mistake had input the same secret note for more than one hypothetical
account. We suspect that this low multiple password interference effect is due to the location cue
provided, which helped guide their secret note input.
In future work, it would be interesting to implement a blacklist such as the one recommended
in Section 7.4, and attempt the same security and usability analysis. We suspect that the security
should improve. In addition to that, it would be interesting to observe the effect on the credential
setting time for GeoPassHints should the setting and confirmation of the secret note appear on the
same page. Lowering the credential setting time will improve the overall usability of GeoPassHints.
5.7 Conclusion
In conclusion, we designed, implemented, and tested a new geographic authentication system
called GeoPassHints. Our security, usability, and deloyability analysis lead us to the conclusion
that GeoPassHints is not particularly usable in a primary authentication environment or a fallback
authentication environment. While the attained average login time is acceptable in a fallback
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authentication environment, it is extremely long for use in a primary authentication environment
(i.e., password replacement).
In addition to that, while GeoPassHints did provide some benefits in relation to security espe-
cially when compared to other commonly utilized methods for fallback authentication (see Table 9
for a comparison), it proved very poor in terms of usability. The long login time might be accept-
able in a fallback authentication environment, but the failure rate of 61% after 7-11 days of setting
is too high . The increased security but poor usability ultimately means that GeoPassHints does
not bridge the security-usability chasm that exists in many authentication systems. As a result, we
do not recommend GeoPassHints as a replacement to the currently used fallback authentication
mechanisms. Certain improvements to the system might lead to better results, but as it stands
GeoPassHints would not fare well on a larger scale implementation by a popular verifier.
Chapter 6
User Study
We evaluated GeoPassHints and GeoSQ for security and usability, in addition to the viabil-
ity of our known adversary frameworks through a 38-participant (19 pairs) user study that was
approved by our university’s Research Ethics Board. Before the studies proceeded both of our
systems (GeoPassHins, and GeoSQ) were pilot tested by 6 colleagues, friends, and family. Three
pilot testers were experienced computer users with degrees in computing science/networking, the
remaining three were casual computer users. Our pilot testing allowed us to discover usability
flaws within our system, in addition to discovering any bugs or development related issues that
could hinder our user study.
Participants for this study were recruited using a broadcast email in addition to posters around
campus. Participation was limited to students, visitors, and staff of our university. In order to
participate, all participants must have met the following criteria:
1. 18 years of age or above.
2. Participants must bring a pair.
3. Participants must have an Android smartphone.
4. Participants must be willing and able to turn on location services throughout the week.
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6.1 Study Sessions
Our user study contained three sessions spanning 6 months and 2 weeks. Session 3, was
scheduled to be 6 months after Session 2, however due to the abysmal memorability and due to
the fact that GeoPassHints did not meet the minimum viability for memorability we elected to
not have a long term memorability study. The pairs completed the exact same steps; we did not
have a main participant and a pair, both pairs performed all parts of this study.
6.1.1 Session 1
Session 1 was an in-lab session that lasted an average of 35 minutes. Each participant was
compensated $8 for their participation. We held Session 1 on several different dates, and different
time slots throughout the day. Each time slot had a maximum of 2 pairs (4 participants). At
the beginning of each iteration of Session 1 we asked pairs to sit across from each other to avoid
any type of contamination of the results (e.g., participant seeing their pair’s secret note or feeling
pressured to answer questions about their relationship differently). Followed by that we read the
instructions to the participants from a prewritten script in order to ensure that there was no
variation in the instructions between the iterations that could affect our results. We also did a
practice run of the system to ensure that the participants knew how to use our systems.
After the instructions portion of Session 1 was complete, the participants were then asked
to open their laptops and login to the GeoPassHints system. After reading the consent form
and agreeing to it, they proceeded to complete the entry survey. The entry survey was a mix
of background questions such as age, gender, academic background, as well as the We Scale, IoS
Scale, and the adapted RCI scale (see Appendix A, B, and C). After the participants completed the
entry survey they would then set a location and a secret note corresponding to four hypothetical
accounts.
The first hypothetical account they enroll a location and a secret note for was their Email
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account, the second hypothetical account they would enroll their credentials for was their bank
account, the third and fourth hypothetical accounts were e-commerce accounts and social media
accounts respectively.
By asking the participants to set their credentials for more than one hypothetical account we
aimed to investigate the effect of multiple password interference [11]. We also wanted to observe
whether or not participants would set their secret note differently based on account type. We
cued the participants as to the account type with a logo representing a major service provider,
for example an Email account would have a Gmail logo because that is a popular Email service
provider (it is the official Email provider for our university).
After each location and secret note enrolled (for each account type) the participants are asked
to confirm their secret note. The location is given to them during the confirmation, but they must
have an exact character match for their secret note to confirm enrollment of their credentials.
After all four hypothetical accounts were enrolled, they have completed the GeoPassHints portion
of Session 1.
At that time, we would instruct participants to take out their Android Smartphones and
download the application with the previously emailed download link. After they install the GeoSQ
application they are asked to read the instructions relating to the app, enter their assigned ID for
the study, and accept the terms and conditions. Lastly, they would be reminded to keep location
services on and we reminded them that GeoSQ is logging location information locally in the
background. We also informed them that location services could be turned off at any time and
turned back on at any time if they did not feel comfortable with their locations being logged at a
certain time. That is the end of Session 1.
6.1.2 Session 2
Session 2 was scheduled 7-11 days after Session 1 in the lab. Session 2 lasted an average of 45
minutes and participants were compensated $10 for their participation. In addition to that the
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participating pairs were entered into a $100 draw if they were both present for Session 2.
The purpose of Session 2 being scheduled 7-11 days after Session 1 was to assess memorability
as well as allowing time for the GeoSQ application to log location information (the requirement was
ten unique locations before the application unlocks). Session 2 also started with the instructions
being read off a prewritten script to avoid variations in the instructions having an effect on the
study results. We also demonstrated the systems in Session 2 to ensure all participants knew how
to use both our systems and what was expected of them.
After the participants were given time to read the consent form, the participants were then
asked to login to the GeoPassHints system again. They would then begin by trying to remember
the credentials they set 7-11 days ago. They were given the location as a cue and they just had
to remember the secret note associated with that location. For each account type (hypothetical
email, bank, e-commerce, and social account) the participants were given five tries. If they are
unsuccessful after five tries they were asked to reset that account’s login credentials.
After the participants completed the recall portion of Session 2 for GeoPassHints, they were
asked to guess their pair’s secret note (again given the location on a Google Map as a cue). The
pairs had five guess attempts for each hypothetical account type (hypothetical email, bank, e-
commerce, and social media). However, the pairs were not told if they guessed the secret note
correctly or incorrectly. The pairs were simply given five attempts and were not given any feedback
to preserve the privacy of their pair.
Following the guessing portion of Session 2 for GeoPassHints, the pairs were then asked usability
questions regarding GeoPassHints. At that point we were done with GeoPassHints for Session 2
and we switched the participants’ attention to GeoSQ (the smartphone-based autobiographical
authentication system).
The participants were prompted with ten questions regarding their whereabouts throughout
the previous 7-11 days. After that was complete the pairs were asked to switch phones, at this
time the participants were asked to attempt to guess their pairs’ location questions throughout
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previous 7-11 days, these were the exact same questions asked of their pair.
The participants were asked to switch phones because the autobiographical location data was
logged locally, and to further protect the participant’s privacy we did not want to relay that
information on a network of any kind to avoid a leak scenario. They were asked to sit next to each
other to avoid any kind of discomfort from having their smartphone with their pair without the
ability to see what their pair was doing with it. We also kindly requested that the participants
not communicate at all during this period to avoid the contamination of results.
During the location recall and location guessing phases of Session 2 the users were actively
encouraged to use the Internet for research. Some sources such as their Google Timelines or
transportation system cards can give them information regarding their whereabouts at a certain
point in time (we observed those two sources being used).
After the pairs had completed guessing their pair’s locations throughout the past 7-11 days they
would return each other’s smartphones and they would begin the exit survey which is composed of
similar usability questions that were asked after the GeoPassHints system. However, this time the
usability questions were obviously geared towards GeoSQ. The exit survey marked the termination
of Session 2.
6.2 Participants
Our recruited participants were all undergraduate students between the ages of 18-30. The
average age of our participants was 21.3. Out of our 38 initial participants, 13 were female (34.2%)
and 25 were male (65.7%). As mentioned earlier, in order to meet the criteria for participation our
participants had to be a minimum of 18 years of age (age of majority in our jurisdiction), and they
were required to come in pairs. Each participant had to have his/her own Android smartphone
(Android 3 or above). 15 of our participants (39%) had taken some computer security/IT course
before.
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6.3 Study Environment
The first two sessions of our user study were conducted in person. Participants were required
to bring their own smartphones and they were also required to bring their own laptops to be able
to participate in this study. The sessions were held in a secluded room, and a maximum of two
pairs were scheduled for each iteration of Session 1 and Session 2. This environment was carefully
designed to allow us to ensure participant comfort, and ensure no communication was occurring
between participant pairs.
6.4 Limitations and Ecological Validity
Our initial two sessions are completed in person in a lab environment, as opposed to being
conducted online on a platform such as Amazon’s Mechanic Turk. This is a limitation because
our data obtained is from a small set of participants from a similar demographic (relatively similar
age, university students). The user study was conducted in this fashion to allow us to ensure
participant comfort, and ensure no communication was occurring between participant pairs. In
addition to that, it would be difficult to know if the online participants were truly pairs.
We recognize the fact that GeoPassHints and GeoSQ would be utilized by a more diverse
demographic in a real-world scenario. We also recognize the fact that different patterns in the
secret notes being set, and different patterns in answers to GeoSQ’s autobiographical location
questions might emerge given a more diverse demographic. However, this is the method currently
used for studies that evaluate the known adversary, for the reasons mentioned above. A larger
online study (with a different user study design) to determine the usability and security of our
systems is not in order until results from a study involving a smaller set of participants such as
ours has already provided us with some preliminary results.
Another limitation is presented to us by the “lab effect” [27]. Conducting studies in a lab
environment is proven to have a significant impact on the results obtained. For example, it was
CHAPTER 6. USER STUDY 127
shown that participants in formal lab environments typically act and perform a certain way that
they would not in their everyday lives. Additional patterns might be observed should this user
study be conducted online without a researcher present; this could include a higher occurrence of
reused notes. Throughout the lab, participants were being given instructions that aided in their
utilization of the system. This does not mimic a real-world environment.
Moreover, the time for each Session was long and a financial incentive was presented. That
could also be another factor related to the “lab effect” that challenges the real world ecological
validity. Participants might be pressured to complete the study quicker in order to be financially
rewarded quicker.
In addition to that, we cannot control what the pairs communicate to each other after the
study, they could let each other know their locations/secret notes anytime throughout the week.
In addition to that, there was no reward for guessing locations correctly or guessing secret
notes correctly; in fact, the participants never knew those scores (for privacy reasons). Therefore,
participants did not have a real incentive to guess correctly (they were compensated no matter how
well they guessed). This does not imitate a motivated known adversary in a real-world environment
that might be more motivated to gain access to an account or a device.
Furthermore, we would like to comment on the order of systems in which the study was com-
pleted. As mentioned above, GeoPassHints was always the first system that participants interacted
with. In hindsight that could have created a usability issue due to the fact that the study sessions
were quite long. When participants were completing the GeoPassHints exist survey they were
typically twenty minutes into the second session. However, when they were completing the GeoSQ
exit survey they were typically 35 to 40 minutes into their second session of the study. In hindsight
the order in which GeoPassHints and GeoSQ were tested in the study sessions should have been
switched. We cannot say anything for certain because there is no way to measure this effect after
the fact, but it could have had a negative impact on the usability and results of GeoSQ due to the
long study sessions.
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Lastly, the exit survey for each GeoPassHints and GeoSQ were highly similar (almost identical
questions). However, there are more effective tools to gauge usability. We designed the exit survey
questions from scratch, and we modelled these questions using a comparative approach were we
asked whether or not they would prefer to use this system over another, typically in the same
domain (fallback authentication in the case of GeoSQ and fallback or primary authentication in
the case of GeoPassHints). In the exit survey we also included questions to gauge participant
concerns regarding privacy leaks as a result of utilizing GeoPassHints and GeoSQ. In hindsight we
could have asked those questions at the end of Session 1 to decrease the length of the exit survey
(the longer the session the more we could observe that the participants just wanted to leave).
The diagram below illustrates the exact sequence of events that occurred during the Sessions.
Figure 6.1: Sequence of events during Session 1 and Session 2.
Chapter 7
Discussion
7.1 Interpreting Results from the Known Adversary Mod-
els
In this work, we created three models, all of which proved better at predicting the extent to
which a participant would be able to guess his/her pair’s location question from the past 7-11 days
than simply relying on self-reported relationship characterization. Two of the models we used to
quantify the known adversary (the KAI and the adapted RCI) proved to be highly correlated with
the GeoSQ pair guessing scores, indicating their promise.
Our primary goal was to quantify the known adversary more accurately than self-reported
relationship closeness as used in existing security research. However, the general utilization of the
KAI and the adapted RCI comes with some reservations. Both the KAI and the adapted RCI
are heavily geared towards the concept of physical proximity, due to the definition of the known
adversary which is any individual with elevated knowledge of a potential victim and/or elevated
access to a potential victim’s devices. Since GeoSQ is an autobiographical location authentication
system, and the KAI and the adapted RCI have many questions regarding physical proximity,
it is possible that high scores from the KAI and the adapted RCI could be better suited to
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autobiographical data for authentication than other systems. Since the KAI and the adapted RCI
were only tested against GeoSQ, in future work it will be important to use them when performing
user studies with different authentication systems as further proof of concept.
Another important question to address is the known adversary classification point. In other
words, at what point do we classify an attacker to be a known adversary based on the results in
the KAI or the adapted RCI? Based on our results, any participant score above 40 points typically
yielded great guessing results. However, we caution that this score should not be used as a general
cutoff point. Consider for example, given a different authentication system, participants with
scores above 30 on the adapted RCI or the KAI could have great guessing scores. Based on that
particular analysis, the cut off for the known adversary should be 30. Hence, we do not recommend
a generalized cut off score, instead we recommend that security researchers evaluate whether a
system is Vulnerable-to-the-Known-Adversary, by detecting a correlation between the guessing
scores and the model scores. Should a high correlation exist then their authentication system
would be declared vulnerable to the known adversary, if the guessing scores lack a correlation with
the model scores then the authentication system is deemed not vulnerable to the known adversary.
Certain authentication systems will not yield a significant correlation with the KAI or the
adapted RCI scores because there is a low probability that the authentication credential can be
guessed. For example, GeoPassHints guessing scores would naturally not lead to a high correlation
with the KAI score or the adapted RCI score because so few of them were guessed successfully.
Certain authentication systems will have a very low probability of being guessed, and GeoPassHints
was one of them, that is why no correlation analysis was conducted with GeoPassHints and the
KAI or the adapted RCI. Only 2.9% (4/136) secret notes were guessed therefore all the correlation
tests we ran were negative.
Furthermore, another important point to discuss is what are we truly measuring. In our
research we began by investigating relationship closeness. However, as noted earlier, the known
adversary does not necessarily have to be an individual that we consider to be socially close. The
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known adversary can be a co-worker, physical proximity to a co-worker can be more pertinent than
physical proximity to a spouse in some cases. That is what motivated the design of the adapted RCI
and the KAI. If we were simply measuring relationship closeness, we would have simply utilized the
original RCI or the Oneness score, but our objective was different. When designing the adapted
RCI and the KAI, we kept in mind that the known adversary does not necessarily have to be
socially close. That is why they are not geared towards measuring relationship closeness, instead
they are geared towards measuring factors such as proximity and influence which are indicators of
an individual with elevated access to a potential victim’s devices and/or elevated knowledge of a
potential victim.
Lastly, the KAI and the adapted RCI scores obtained highly similar correlations to the GeoSQ
pair guessing scores. While the adapted RCI did obtain slightly better results, the difference was
miniscule. The adapted RCI contains 7 questions from the original RCI that measure the influence
that one person has over the other. Since the results from the adapted RCI were only slightly better
than the correlation results obtained utilizing the KAI, it is recommended that the adapted RCI
be the standard model utilized to measure the known adversary going forward. The justification
behind that lies in the 7 questions from the original RCI that attempt gauge influence. Since the
KAI does not contain these 7 influence gauging questions, and is more geared towards quantifying
the known adversary by using proximity questions, we expect that it will not perform well in
establishing a correlation between the guessing scores of pairs in studies evaluating authentication
frameworks that have nothing to do with autobiographical data.
We stress that the results obtained from the KAI and the adapted RCI are preliminary. Testing
on a wider scale with a more diverse demographic is necessary to provide further proof of concept
that the utilization of the KAI or the adapted RCI is indeed more fruitful for security research.
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7.2 Comparison of Results GeoSQ/GeoPassHints
This section will be dedicated to comparing the results obtained from the security, usability, and
deployability analysis of GeoPassHints and GeoSQ. We will utilize the Bonneau et al. [18] frame-
work in order to guide this comparison, while focusing on the important metrics and categories
where one authentication system was superior to the other. Table 7.1 showcases the comparison
of GeoSQ, GeoPassHints as well as commonly utilized fallback authentication techniques.
Before we delve into the comparison it is important to note the target environment. GeoSQ is
more suited towards a mobile fallback authentication environment, wheras GeoPassHints is more
versatile and can be utilized in any primary or fallback authentication environment. Both of the
authentication systems we devised failed to meet several important metrics in terms of usability,
therefore we would not currently recommend them to be replacements to current primary/fallback
authentication mechanisms.
7.2.1 Security
Both GeoSQ and GeoPassHints failed to meet the threshold to be Resilient-to-the-Known-
Adversary. Despite that, GeoPassHints performed considerably better than GeoSQ in being able
to repel the known adversary with only 2.9% of secret notes being guessed by the pairs. On the
other hand, roughly 11% of pairs were successful in guessing 7/10 locations which was the threshold
we set for GeoSQ.
Both systems appeared to be Resilient-to-Social-Media-Mining. The average number of location
posts per week was 1.26 which is not significant enough to completely compromise a system such
as GeoSQ due to the high number of questions asked. Since only 4 secret notes were guessed by
pairs in our user study, we conclude that following each other on social media could did not greatly
contribute to a pair’s ability to guess secret notes.
Lastly, there are two security metrics that GeoSQ is superior to GeoPassHints in. GeoSQ has
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a significantly larger sample space because 7 correct answers out of 10 are required. Therefore, it
is Resilient-to-Unthrottled-Guessing. While we could not run a similar password cracking analysis
on GeoSQ that we performed on GeoPassHints (because we did not have access to the locations),
the sample space is large enough that a password cracker attempting guessing would fail due to
the system settings (you do not get more than one shot at answering a location questions). On
the other hand, our password cracking analysis performed on GeoPassHints secret notes yielded a
higher end of 20% of secret notes being guessed by utilizing the semantic cracker [51]. The second
security metric that GeoSQ is superior to GeoPassHints in is the resilience to physical observation.
GeoPassHints offers similar protection against physical observation as passwords. However, in
order to compromise GeoSQ, a prolonged period of physical observation is required, hence making
it more immune to physical observation attacks.
According to our analysis, GeoSQ appears to be the most secure authentication system in
principal. However, it is extremely vulnerable o the known adversary while GeoPassHints is less
so. Refer to Table 7.1 for a side by side comparison.
7.2.2 Usability
Both GeoSQ and GeoPassHints obtained terrible results in our usability analysis. There is only
one category that GeoSQ outperforms GeoPassHints in, which is Scalable-for-Users. The burden
on the user does not increase when the number of verifiers that utilize GeoSQ increases, because it
is the same location data that will be utilized. In the case of GeoPassHints however, the number
of secret notes will greatly increase the memory burden on the user should many verifiers adopt
GeoPassHints.
Both GeoPassHints and GeoSQ are extremely inefficient to use and have frequent errors due
to the high login time and the high error rate in both systems. In addition to that, GeoSQ
performs very poorly in terms of credential setting time. While the credential setting is happening
automatically through the user’s natural movements, it still does take 7-11 days to gather 10
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unique locations. So theoretically GeoSQ needs anywhere between 7-11 days to set credentials on
average.
GeoSQ does not offer the perk of being easy to recover from loss. Should the user fail to
authenticate when asked ten questions, it would be difficult to wait for a new set of questions to
be generated (because the user would need to move around). Alternative system designs could
reuse location questions, but the current configuration of GeoSQ does not. When compared to
GeoPassHints, that is not very efficient, as the reset + reconfirm time for GeoPassHints is compa-
rable to the initial set + confirm time at around one minute on average for each account type.
7.2.3 Deployability
In terms of deployability, both GeoSQ and GeoPassHints scored identically on the Bonneau
et al. framework [18]. The accessibility of authentication schemes that rely on maps is very
important. We believe the Google Maps API provides a great set of accessibility features [1] in a
mobile environment or in a browser environment.
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Table 7.1: Adapted Bonneau et al. framework [18]. Analysis of Security Questions [44], analysis
of web passwords [19]. Please note that the two extra security categories that we added were not












































































































































































































































































































































– offers the benefit, – almost offers the benefit, no circle – does not offer the benefit, –
potential to have the benefit , – potential to almost offer the benefit, – better than passwords,
– worse than passwords
Chapter 8
Conclusion
In conclusion, we designed, implemented, and tested two authentication systems for security,
usability, and deployability. The results of our analysis concluded that GeoPassHints and GeoSQ
would not be usable in a primary authentication or fallback authentication environment due to
the high error rate and the long login time. According to the Bonneau et al. [18] framework
analysis (refer to Table 7.1) the relative security that both GeoSQ and GeoPassHints offer is
stronger than commonly utilized methods of fallback authentication such as security questions,
Email resets, and SMS resets. However, the usability of GeoPassHints and GeoSQ is the real
drawback against recommending these authentication systems according to the Bonneau et al. [18]
framework analysis.
Moreover, we developed three different models in an attempt to quantify the known adversary.
This was done in the hopes of addressing a flaw in current security research where known adversaries
are classified as either strong or weak based on self-reported closeness measures. Two of our models
(the KAI and the adapted RCI) showed promising correlation results with GeoSQ pair guessing
scores. As a result, we recommend that future work should utilize the KAI and the adapted
RCI with different types of authentication systems (since we only performed the analysis with an
autobiographical authentication system) for further proof of concept.
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Digital remake of the original is a courtesy of: The Common Cold Project [2]
INSTRUCTIONS:
We would like you to estimate the amount of time you typically spend alone with
your spouse/partner (referred to as SP below) during the day. We would like you to
make these time estimates by breaking the day into morning, afternoon, and evening,
although you should interpret each of these time periods in terms of your own typical
daily schedule. (For example, if you work a night shift, “morning” may actually reflect
time in the afternoon, but is nevertheless time immediately after waking.) Think back
over the past week and write in the average amount of time, per day, that you spent
alone with your SP, with no one else around, during each time period. If you did not
spend any time with SP in some time periods, write 0 hour(s) and 0 minutes.
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INSTRUCTIONS:
The following is a list of different activities that people may engage in over the
course of one week. For each of the activities listed, please check all of those that
you have engaged in alone with SP in the past week. Check only those activities that
were done alone with SP and not done with SP in the presence of others.
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INSTRUCTIONS:
The following questions concern the amount of influence SP has on your thoughts,
feelings, and behavior. Using the 7-point scale below, please indicate the extent
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to which you agree or disagree with each statement by placing an “X” over the
appropriate circle.
INSTRUCTIONS:
Now we would like you to tell us how much SP affects your future plans and goals.
Using the 7-point scale below, please indicate the degree to which your future plans
and goals are affected by SP by placing an “X” over the appropriate circle for each
item. If an area does not apply to you (e.g. you have no plans or goals in that area),
put an “X” over the circle for “1” (not at all).
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Appendix B
IoS Scale & We Scale
IoS Scale:
Please note that this is a remake of the original for web viewing purposes.
We Scale:
“Please, select the appropriate number below to indicate to what extent you would use the
term “WE” to characterize you and [This Individual]. Answers were on a 7-point scale (1 = “not
at all”; 7 = “very much so ”)” [24]
This is the exact wording for the We Scale, we “[This Individual]” with “your pair”.




Questions in the original RCI are marked with a red asterisk.
1. What is the approximate number of hours in physical proximity to your pair per week? This
refers to the total number of hours you and your pair are in the same house, in the same













2. Approximately how many meals do you share with your pair per week?
Scoring Range:
152










3. Does your pair have access do any of your social media accounts? This could mean a social
media account password.
Scoring:
Yes = 10 points
No = 0 points
4. Does your pair have restricted physical access to your devices/accounts? (i.e. , does your
pair have access to your locked device?)
Yes = 10 points
No = 0 points
5. Does your pair have unrestricted access to your devices/accounts? (i.e. , do they know one
or more of your passwords?)
Yes = 15 points
No = 0 points
6. In the past week, approximately how many hours have you spent with your pair awake? (i.e.
, at home together, in the same work space, or in the same social gathering).
Scoring Range:











7. Does your pair affect your vacation plans? *
Likert Scale question with seven levels. The score the level chosen (i.e, 1 = pair has no
power, 7 = pair has significant power to affect your vacation plans).
8. Does your pair have any affect/influence on your marriage plans? *
Likert Scale question with seven levels. The score the level chosen (i.e, 1 = pair has no
power, 7 = pair has significant power to affect your marriage plans).
9. Does your pair have any affect/influence on your plans to have children? *
Likert Scale question with seven levels. The score the level chosen (i.e, 1 = pair has no
power, 7 = pair has significant power to affect your plans to have children).
10. Does your pair have any affect/influence on your plans to make major investments? *
Likert Scale question with seven levels. The score the level chosen (i.e, 1 = pair has no
power, 7 = pair has significant power to affect your major investment plans).
11. Does your pair have any affect/influence on your plans to join a club/social organization? *
Likert Scale question with seven levels. The score the level chosen (i.e, 1 = pair has no
power, 7 = pair has significant power to affect your plans to join a club/social organization).
12. Does your pair have any affect/influence on your school related plans? *
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Likert Scale question with seven levels. The score the level chosen (i.e, 1 = pair has no
power, 7 = pair has significant power to affect your school related plans).
13. Does your pair have any affect/influence on your financial standing/wellbeing? * Likert
Scale question with seven levels. The score the level chosen (i.e, 1 = pair has no power, 7 =
pair has significant power to affect your financial standing/wellbeing).
14. Do you and your pair follow each other on social media?
Yes = 10 points
No = 0 points
If the answer was no questions 15-17 were not asked.












16. How often do you see your pair’s social media posts per week?
Scoring Range:
17. How many times per week do see your pair’s social media posts relating to his/her location?
(This could be a check in , a snapchat post indicative of location etc...).
Scoring Range:




















GeoPassHints Exit Survey Questions
1. Was GeoPassHints easy to use? Likert Scale with seven levels.
2. Was GeoPassHints easy to learn how to use? Likert Scale with seven levels.
3. For a mobile device’s forgotten password/PIN or failed biometric, to what extent would you





4. For an online account’s forgotten password, to what extent would you prefer to use this
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Likert Scale with seven levels for each fallback authentication method.
5. I would prefer to use the GeoPassHints system to login to any of the following accounts,
instead of entering a password, for these account types.
i. Email Account
ii. Online Bank Account
iii. Social Networking Account
iv. E-Commerce Account
v. Other Infrequently Accessed Accounts
vi. Mobile Device
vii. University Account
viii. Job Related Account
Likert Scale with seven levels for each account type.
6. If you use this system (GeoPassHints), how likely do you think it is that someone you know
could access your devices/accounts with your consent.
Likert Scale with seven levels.
7. How concerned are you about a privacy leak on any medium.
Likert Scale with seven levels.
Appendix E
GeoSQ Exit Survey Questions
There is only one different question from the GeoPassHints exist survey that is marked clearly
with a red aseterisk.
1. Was GeoSQ easy to use? Likert Scale with seven levels.
2. Was GeoSQ easy to learn how to use? Likert Scale with seven levels.
3. For a mobile device’s forgotten password/PIN or failed biometric, to what extent would you





Likert Scale with seven levels for each fallback authentication method.
4. For an online account’s forgotten password, to what extent would you prefer to use this
system (GeoSQ) in lieu of any of the following fallback authentication methods?
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Likert Scale with seven levels for each fallback authentication method.
5. I would prefer to use the GeoSQ system to login to any of the following accounts, instead of
entering a password, for these account types.
i. Email Account
ii. Online Bank Account
iii. Social Networking Account
iv. E-Commerce Account
v. Other Infrequently Accessed Accounts
vi. Mobile Device
vii. University Account
viii. Job Related Account
Likert Scale with seven levels for each account type.
6. If you use this system (GeoSQ), how likely do you think it is that someone you know could
access your devices/accounts with your consent.
Likert Scale with seven levels.
7. How concerned are you about a privacy leak on any medium. Likert Scale with seven levels.
8. To what extent are you concerned of a privacy leak as a result of applications utilizing
location services? *
Likert Scale with seven levels.
Appendix F
Bonneau et al. Framework





In order for an authentication system to be considered
Memorywise-Effortless it must not require a user to re-
member any secret at all [18]. A system is rewarded
with the status of being Quasi-Memorywise-Effortless if
there is only one secret to remember for all verifiers [18].
Scalable-for-
Users
An authentication system is considered Scalable-for-
Users if using the authentication system for many ac-
counts does not put any extra burden on the user [18].
For example, if a user is asked to set multiple passwords
across different verifiers, then as the number of accounts
increase, the burden on the user is increasing.
161
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Nothing-to-
Carry
This category is awarded to authentication systems that
do not require the user to carry anything to be able to
authenticate. Some systems require a physical card to be
present for authentication, these systems would not be
granted the Nothing to Carry accolade [18]. Moreover,
an authentication system is given the status of Quasi
Nothing to Carry if the user will carry this device any-
way (i.e., a smartphone) [18].
Physically-
Effortless
This category is granted to authentication systems that
do not require the user to perform any action past the
pressing of a button (to indicate authentication is oc-
curring i.e., submit) [18].
Easy-to-
Learn
In order to a system to be classified Easy-to-Learn users
must be able to learn how to use it without too much
effort and attention required, and must be able to re-
member how to use it with ease [18]
Efficient-to-
Use
In order to an authentication system to be considered
Efficient to Use the time spent for each authentication
must be acceptably short [18], the time required for a
user to set up his/her credentials with a verifier should
also be reasonable [18]. Bonneau et al. do not specify
empirical values for this subcategory which is appropri-
ate because of the variety of authentication systems and
the variety of intended uses.
Infrequent
Errors
An authentication system may be awarded in the In-
frequent Errors subcategory if the login task typically




This subcategory rewards authentication systems that
make it easy to recover from loss.
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Deployability subcategories:
Subcategory Explanation
Accessible This subcategory is awarded to authentication schemes





This subcategory is awarded to authentication schemes
that do not increase the burden on the verifier or the au-
thentication schemes that do not user in terms of cost.
Startups with revenue per user should be able to rea-
sonably utilize this authentication scheme [18]
Server-
Compatible
This subcategory is awarded to authentication schemes
that are compatible with text-based passwords and do
not require any changes in the backend [18]
Browser-
Compatible
This subcategory is awarded to authentications schemes
with broad compatibility to the browsers of the current
time [18]
Mature This subcategory is awarded to authentication schemes
that have been tried and tested on a large scale in a
real-world environment [18]






An authentication scheme is considered Resilient-to-
Physical-Observation when an attacker cannot reason-
ably successfully impersonate a user after observing
them authenticate one or more times. An authenti-
cation system is considered Quasi-resilient-to-physical-
observation, when the authentication scheme can only
be compromised by physically observing a user authen-




An authentication scheme is considered Resilient-to-
Targeted-Impersonation if it is resilient to attacks that




An authentication system is awarded this benefit if an
attacker, while being constrained by a verifier, cannot
compromise more than 1% of accounts a year given ten




An authentication system is Resilient-to-Unthrottled-
Guessing if an attacker with the ability to guess 240





An authentication scheme is Resilient-to-Internal-
Observation if the attacker cannot impersonate the le-
gitimate user by intercepting the legitimate user’s input.
An example of internal observation would be key logging
or recording the screen of the legitimate user and relay-





An authentication scheme is classified as Resilient-to-
Leaks-from-other-Verifiers ; if anything, another verifier
leaks could potentially help an attacker impersonate a
legitimate user [18].
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Resilient-to-
Phishing
An authentication scheme is Resilient-to-Phishing if an
attacker posing as a verifier cannot fool the user into
giving up authentication credentials/personal informa-
tion [18]. Please note that this subcategory only refers
to classical phishing attacks.
Resilient-to-
Theft
This subcategory is geared towards authentication
schemes that require some sort of physical object
or hardware token for verification. authentication
Resilient-to-Theft is awarded to schemes that cannot be




This subcategory rewards authentication schemes that




This subcategory is awarded to authentication schemes
that require the user to initiate an authentication. It is
regarded as a security and privacy feature [18].
Unlinkable An authentication scheme is classified as Unlinkable if a
set of colluding verifiers cannot determine from the au-
thentication credentials alone, whether or not it belongs
to the same user on multiple different platforms [18].
